在公司治理中的關聯(lián)方交易[文獻翻譯]

本科畢業(yè)論文（設計）外 文 翻 譯題 目 上市公司關聯(lián)方交易相關問題的探討 專 業(yè) 會 計 學 外文題目 Related Party Transactions in Corporate Governance外文出處 Second University of Naples Ttaly 外文作者 Michele Pizzo 原文:Related Party Transactions in Corporate GovernanceIntruductionUntil recent scandals related party transactions did not deserve indepth analyses; academic research mainly focused on different issues and limited attention was paid by regulators and overseers too. Accounting was mainly concerned with potentially biased financial figures; not being carried out at arms length, they might diverge from market prices. Meanwhile, in governance studies and codes topics such as board composition and independence, audit committee, directors remuneration, etc,largely prevailed. As a matter of fact, financial disclosure suited both accounting and governance studies because the information required was both a proxy of potential accounting bias and a tool for monitoring purposes .However, Enrons, Adelphias and Parmalats2 crises shed light on the inherent risks, as related party transactions emerged as a powerful instrument of financial frauds, shareholders expropriation, etc.,turning the veil from the many relevant loopholes affecting existing requirements.Such a discovery has obliged regulators and standard setters to strengthen current rules and principles and/or introduce new bans and requirements. A clear shift towards better and more detailed disclosure and the implementation of monitoring procedures (i.e. board approval,independent directors involvement, external qualified opinions) can be easily observed (i.e. O.E.C.D. 2004) and considered an effective strategy (Djankov et al., 2005). Such a process is still on-going and its impact cannot yet be properly examined.Contemporarily, thanks to the substantial anecdotal evidence, provided also by former scandals, the suspicious attitude and the negative common perceptions, generally accompanying these operations, became more widely and profoundly accepted. Review of the literature and the regulatory framework does not provide a clear and definite picture, but it supports many shades of opinion and reveals both theoretical and operational open issues, deserving further and more detailed analysis.This paper carries out a critical survey of the literature on the issue .and attempts to examine the economic rationale behind related party transactions. In the last part the European state-of-the-art is reviewed in order to assess its thoroughness and consistency with the economic nature of related party transactions.Related party transactions as conflict of interestsThe topic has always been studied in the literature according to two different theories:a) conflict of interests;b) efficient transaction hypothesis.According to the former, related party transactions may imply moral hazard and may be carried out in the interest of directors in order to expropriate wealth from shareholders. By contrast, the latter considers these dealings as sound business exchanges fulfilling economic needs of the firm. Academic research consistent with the former approach has thrown light on the drawbacks associated with related party transactions:a) weakening corporate governance. Related party transactions may undermine non-executive directors functions, turning them into affiliated or “grey” directors, classified as non-independent outside (Denis and Sarin, 1999; Klein, 2002; Vicknair et al., 1993;Weisbach, 1988), closer to dependent directors. Furthermore, weaker corporate governance makes these transactions more likely to occur, while board independence and their lower probability are positively associated (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2004;Gordon et al., 2004);b) earnings management (i.e. “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain”; Schipper, 1989). Directors have incentives to manage earnings to increase or legitimate their perquisites or to hide such wealth expropriation. Related party transactions may turn out to be a useful tool for managing earnings (Jian and Wong, 2008; Aharony et al., 2005), operating results and achieving ROE or other targets (i.e. avoiding delisting, new equity issue placement) (Jian and Wong, 2003; Ming and Wong, 2003); c) tunneling, i.e. wealth transfers out of a company for the benefit of shareholders with a controlling interest (Johnson et al., 2000). A company may pay a related party transaction above market prices or pay market prices for goods or services of inferior quality3. Such a phenomenon does not necessarily imply opportunistic behaviour,but may be due to an overconfident approach or biased judgement (for instance, overestimating ones relatives, Ryngaert and Thomas, 2007).Transfer of assets and profits, although common in developed countries, becomes more relevant and frequent in emerging economies where external markets are inadequate or corporate governance rules are lacking and, presumably, less effective (Jian and Wong, 2004; Jiang et al, 2005); d) employment of relatives in family firms. A director can be appointed or promoted owing to his family influence over the company;e) misleading statement. Many studies provide evidence of their role in many financial crises (Swartz and Watkins, 2003; Mc Tague,2004) and in the achievement of specific aims (Erickson,2000). Moreover, apart from these cases, these transactions are generally regarded as less reliable than arms length ones.Because of these factors, related party transactions may be associated with abnormal stock returns (Cheung et al., 2006), firms poor performances (Chen and Chien, 2004) or lower value (Gordon et al., 2004;Jian and Wong, 2004).The previous circumstances support the idea that these transactions represent a conflict of interest (conflict of interest hypothesis) and that they are inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization (Emshwiller,2003). To this extent, such a view encompasses agency issues and is consistent with an agency prospective (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) where owners face moral hazard (lack of effort or misuse of company resources) and adverse selection by the CEO (misrepresentation of ability). Thus, risk sharing policies, monitoring, information systems are adopted and, in particular, mechanisms like CEO compensation and board structure are suggested. Once framed in such a context,related party transactions may imply the misuse of firm resources (moral hazard) and the misrepresentation of private information (adverse selection)too: their potential harm in eluding alignment mechanisms, like CEO compensation and board composition, is increasingly perceived.Moreover, the potential bias in financial statements, with a negative impact on their reliability and relevance, introduces further uncertainty and weakens the effectiveness of contracts aiming at reducing agency conflicts.In particular, according to agency theory (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) an optimal board composition requires both executive members as well as external (non-executive) directors, thus monitoring becomes even more crucial when non-executive directors are involved (Gordon et al., 2004). Not surprisingly, these findings contributed in definitely shifting opinion in favour of the view that related party transactions represent conflict of interests, compromising directors independence and monitoring functions, potentially serving deceptive and fraudulent purposes. Indeed this idea, has always largely prevailed, but corporate collapses and, to some extent, literature provided ultimate evidence of possible abuses and, moreover, a difficult point to challenge. The risks of harm to company shareholders through self-interested decisions by directors, spoiling corporate wealth, are often stressed in business press and in regulators positions, thereby favouring widespread acceptance of the prevailingly negative meaning of the term. The ability to influence the counterpart even in contrast with its own interests, the departure from terms applied in relationships with third parties and, last but not least, the potential wealth transfers are often recalled by S.E.C. and F.A.S.B. (F.A.S. 57).The following quotation from the 2008 CONSOB draft on related party transactions enlightens as to the cautions and adverse approach lying behind the suggested changes: “In general, , the existence of companies interest in carrying out related party transaction cannot be a priori excluded. In a few cases, they may be seen as efficient transactions ”. Their economic soundness is not, in principle, rejected, but is clearly limited to few cases, and even then the asymmetrical information among insiders and outsiders leads to stricter regulation.Indeed, definitions like “accounting minefields” (Sherman and Young, 2001) clearly express the general mood.Not surprisingly, growing concern for abuses, lack of information symmetry, negative influence on directors independence and integrity and weakening of monitoring functions is warranted among overseers and standard setters. In actual fact, newly introduced rules or principles,aimed at improving disclosure and implementing more effective monitoring procedures, represent a clear attempt to balance the above-mentioned risks and perceptions.Specifically, solutions enhancing conflict of interest provisions, such as:- monitoring procedures like board approval, independent directors involvement, audit committee evaluation, external independent opinion, assembly approval;- increasing disclosure concerning subjects, type of transactions,amount, terms and conditions, alignment with market conditions,etc. In fact, investors can analyse the possible expropriation and weight it in order to discount equity prices (Barth, 1994; Wilkins and Zimmer, 1983; Harris and Ohlson, 1987; Sami and Schwartz,1992);- ban on some operations i.e. employment-loans, prohibited by Sox in 2002.gain wide support and seem unavoidable measures to cope with the perceived risks.At the same time, the consistency of the above-mentioned measures with agency theory principles, that suggests monitoring, incentive alignment and control of managers to minimize the agency problems (Tosi,2008), can be easily perceived.However, costs of monitoring and of reporting complexity increase sharply because of the former measures and they add on the potential economic costs associated to related party transactions (due to wealth transfers, earnings management, etc.) as well as the associated opportunity costs (often widely neglected). The overall resulting negative impact on performance can be legitimately presumed and could improperly represent a cage for this sort of transaction, to which recourse may be limited. The efficient transaction hypothesis In contrast with the previous approach, the efficient transaction hy-pothesis assumes that related party transactions represent sound business exchanges, efficiently fulfilling underlying economic needs of the firm. Therefore, they do not harm the interests of shareholders and emerge as an efficient contracting arrangement where incomplete information there is. Moreover, possible benefits may be: -contracting parties representatives appointed as board members facilitate the achievement of better coordination of the different activities, quicker feed back or more insights; -deeper reciprocal knowledge as well as greater familiarity can justify transactions that are not feasible at arms length or create more convenient terms and conditions for both parties; - hold up problem may be mitigated; -these transactions may also supplement CEO and director cash remuneration or compensate them for increased risk. The view of related party transactions representing internal dealings, alternative to contractual or market exchanges, able to reduce transactions costs and overcome difficulties impairing production is consistent with the transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985) and support-ing evidence has been provided by many studies (Fan and Goyal, 2006). In particular, in institutional contexts without efficient capital, labour and product markets, like many developing economies, information and agency problems, as well as market imperfections, increase risks associ-ated to firm activity, while group structures and internal dealings may provide a better allocation of financial resources, economies of scale, easier access to finance, more opportunities, increased influence, etc. Therefore, internal capital markets may be created with beneficial effects for the entire group when external funds are scarce and uncertain (Khanna and Palepu, 1997); scale and scope of the groups permit difficulties impairing production in emerging countries to be overcome and make investment in these regions more likely and profitable (Fisman and Khanna, 2004); sharing technological skills and advertising, associated with available group financial resources, contributes to profitability, supplementing inefficient capital markets and reducing transaction costs (Chang and Hong, 2000; Moscariello, 2007). Nevertheless, evidence is not yet decisive (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) and the possibility of wealth transfers through internal dealings (Chang and Hong, 2000) is not excluded. Moreover, agency issues still play a role in shaping benefits and costs of group affiliation and related problems reduce the beneficial effects deriving internal markets (Claeessens and Fan, 2002; Claessens, et al., 2006). A different conceptual framework: some guidelines Both the above-mentioned theories are affected by inconsistencies or deficiencies and, in providing almost diametrically opposite interpretations, they are unable to cope with different kinds of possible cases. The conflict of interests theory seems probably more sensitive to social needs, such as minority protection and capital market fairness and efficiency. Not surprisingly, its solutions are coherent with the growing concern for these dealings and the political climate around the issue. It could be argued that, to some extent, this perspective offers a “political excuse” to legitimate more binding, disclosure and monitoring requirements.However, this approach is weakened by significant drawbacks or loopholes, some of which are hereinafter briefly examined.Empirical evidence neither always nor consistently accomplishes the expected outcomes. As previously seen, the literature supports contradictory conclusions too and gradually reveals, instead of a black and white picture, a multicoloured portrait, introducing distinctions and warnings which call for specific treatment.Source:University of Naples Italy譯文：在公司治理中的關聯(lián)方交易介紹直到最近，關聯(lián)方交易的丑聞還沒有值得深入分析，學術研究主要側(cè)重于不同問題的局限性引起了規(guī)管機構(gòu)及監(jiān)督員很大的注意力。會計是最受關注的可能有誤差的財務數(shù)字，我們盡自己最大的努力不讓這種誤差存在，他們可能會偏離市場價格。然而審計委員會、董事的報酬等在很大程度上占了上風。事實上，財務信息的披露適合會計和管理研究，因為這兩個研究方向的潛在會計偏見和監(jiān)控目的。然而安然、阿德菲亞的騙局和帕瑪拉特等危機揭示了固有的風險，由于關聯(lián)方交易的出現(xiàn)作為一個強有力的金融欺詐工具被股東利用等，至于從影響現(xiàn)有要求來看，如發(fā)現(xiàn)不得不規(guī)管機構(gòu)及標準的制訂，加強目前的規(guī)則和原則或介紹的很多有關漏洞表面的工具，其實適合會計和治理研究新禁令和要求。明確轉(zhuǎn)向更好和更詳細的披露監(jiān)測程序（即委員會批準、獨立董事參與、外部合格的意見）的實現(xiàn)可以被方便地觀察到（即 O.E.C.D.2004 年)和被視為有效的戰(zhàn)略 （2005 Djankov 等人）。 這一進程仍在進行中，其影響還不能恰當?shù)販y算?？捎^的是，多虧了之前提出的丑聞、質(zhì)疑的態(tài)度和負面的共同看法，通常伴隨這些操作的逸聞實證更廣泛以及更深入地被接受?；仡櫸墨I和規(guī)管架構(gòu)的檢討并沒有提供一個明確的畫面，但它支持很多細微的意見，并顯示理論和業(yè)務值得進一步打開的問題和關鍵問題，這份文件嘗試對檢查關聯(lián)方交易的經(jīng)濟理據(jù)文獻的調(diào)查進行更詳細的分析。最后部分，歐洲國家的文獻被審查，以評估其與關聯(lián)方交易的完整性和一致性。相關方交易的利益沖突主題總是圍繞研究兩個不同文獻的理論：利益的沖突 ；有效事務的假設；根據(jù)之前所述，關聯(lián)方交易可能意味著道德風險，并可能在侵占股東財富方面侵犯董事會的利益。與此相反，后者認為這些交易是滿足經(jīng)濟需求的公司的良好交易。符合前述辦法的學術研究與關聯(lián)方交易相關聯(lián)的缺點已明朗化。a) 削弱公司治理。關聯(lián)方交易可能會破壞與外界（丹尼斯和沙林，1999 年；使用非獨立把它們變?yōu)楦綄倩?quot;灰色"董事分類的非執(zhí)行董事職能；克萊因 2002 年 ；Vicknair 等人，1993年 ；Weisbach，1988年）密切相關的董事之間的關系。此外，較弱的公司治理使這些交易更有可能發(fā)生，然而董事會的獨立性和其較低的發(fā)生概率卻是有效的關聯(lián)（Kohlbeck和Mayhew，2004 年；松等人，2004 年）；b）盈余管理（即"一個明確體現(xiàn)在外部的財務報告流程的管理目標，獲得一些個人利益的意圖"；Schipper，1989年)。董事有管理收入的增加在合法的前提條件或隱藏這種財富征用的獎勵下。關聯(lián)方交易可能是一個有用的工具，用于管理收入 （建和黃，2008 年；Aharony 等人，2005年)，經(jīng)營成果和實現(xiàn)預期盈利或其他目標（即避免除名、新公平問題放置，建和黃，2003年；明、黃，2003年)；c) 隧道效應，即財富轉(zhuǎn)移出的一家公司控制權(quán)益（2000年約翰遜等人）與股東的利益。一家公司可能支付相關方交易價格以上的市場價格或以市場價格支付的劣質(zhì)貨物或服務，這種現(xiàn)象并不一定意味著投機行為的機會，但可能是由于一個自誤的方法或判斷高的見解（為例估之一的親屬，Ryngaert 和托馬斯，2007年).資產(chǎn)和利潤的轉(zhuǎn)化雖然在發(fā)達的國家中變得更切合實際和頻繁，在外部的市場不充分和公司體制缺乏的新興經(jīng)濟中大概很少有效（建和黃，2004 年；江報，2005年）；d）家族企業(yè)的親屬就業(yè)問題。一名董事由于他家庭的影響可以在該公司中被任命或晉升。e)誤導性的陳述。很多研究提供他們在金融危機（瓦金斯 2003 年，McTague，2004年)和實現(xiàn)具體目標（埃里克森 2000年）的角色的證明。此外,除了這些情況下,這些交易普遍被認為比正常交易要缺少可信度。因為這些因素,關聯(lián)交易可能伴有異常股票的回報率(張五常、蘇達權(quán)等,2006年8月),企業(yè)的糟糕的表現(xiàn)(陳和簡,2004)或更低的價值(戈登、蘇達權(quán)等,2004;劍而呂志宗,2004)。以前的情況下都支持這樣一個觀點,即這些交易代表利益沖突(利益沖突的假設),他們不符合股東財富最大化(Emshwiller,2003)。從這個意義上來說,這樣的一種觀點包括代理問題,與一個機構(gòu)未來的(Berle和手段,1932年,延森和Meckling,1976年)業(yè)主面臨道德危機(缺乏努力或濫用公司資源)和首席執(zhí)行官逆向選擇(誤傳的能力)是一致的。因此,風險分擔政策、監(jiān)控、信息系統(tǒng)就被采納了,特別是有些機制如首席執(zhí)行官報酬和董事會結(jié)構(gòu)被允許了。一旦框以這樣一個背景,關聯(lián)交易可能意味著濫用公司資源(道德風險)和過度歪曲私人信息(逆向選擇):他們潛在的有害作用在規(guī)避對口機制,像經(jīng)理人報酬和董事會組成,正變得越來越被感知到。此外,存在潛在偏見的財務報表,在可靠性和相關性方面有負面的影響，介紹了進一步的不確定性以及削弱了針對減少機構(gòu)沖突的代理合同的效力。特別是，根據(jù)代理理論（法瑪，1980;法瑪和詹森，1983）董事會的組成，需要一個最佳的以及外部的（非執(zhí)行）董事和執(zhí)行成員，從而在非執(zhí)行董事參與時監(jiān)控就顯得更加重要。（高登等人，2004）。毫不奇怪，這些研究結(jié)果有助于轉(zhuǎn)移輿論從而以贊成關聯(lián)方交易是代表利益沖突，損害董事的獨立性和監(jiān)測職能，可能提供以欺騙或欺詐目的服務的觀點。事實上這種想法，在很大程度上一直盛行，但企業(yè)倒閉，并且文獻提供了最終可能被濫用的證據(jù)從而使其成為一個挑戰(zhàn)難點。對損害公司股東利益從而利己的決定，破壞企業(yè)的財富，站在商業(yè)媒體和監(jiān)管者的立場上往往是被抨擊的，從而有利于一般性的負面含義廣泛被接受。影響同行的能力甚至和自身的利益能夠形成對比,離開與第三方關系的條款,最后但并非最不重要的是潛在的財富轉(zhuǎn)移往往被F.A.S.B和S.E.C召回到現(xiàn)實中來。(F.A.S 57)從2008年CONSOB關聯(lián)方交易的草案來看，以下注意事項的引文啟示及不良做法說法背后所建議的修改是：“一般情況下對公司進行關聯(lián)方交易時會考慮利益存在的關系，不可能將其排除在外。在少數(shù)情況下，他們可能會被視為有效率的交易.“。他們的經(jīng)濟是非常正確的，原則上不拒絕，但顯然僅限于少數(shù)情況，正是這樣的內(nèi)部和外部之間的信息不對稱關系從而導致了更嚴格的監(jiān)管。的確，像“會計雷區(qū)”的定義 (謝爾曼，2001)明顯地表現(xiàn)出一般情緒，毫不奇怪，人們越來越關注侵權(quán)行為、信息缺乏對稱，對董事的獨立性和完整性以及監(jiān)督職能的弱化的負面影響是監(jiān)督員和制定者之間的必要標準。事實上，新引進的規(guī)則或原則，改善了信息披露的完整性和實施了更有效的監(jiān)測程序，目的是表現(xiàn)了一個明確的嘗試以平衡上述風險和觀點。具體來說，提高利益沖突的解決方案規(guī)定，如：-董事會批準的監(jiān)測，參與獨立董事，審計委員會的評價，外部獨立意見，大會批準程序；-增加披露有關科目，交易金額，條款和充分的市場條件等。事實上，投資者可以分析征用和重視它的重要性以使股票價格打折（巴特，1994年；威爾金斯和Zimmer，1983；哈里斯和奧爾森，1987；薩米和Schwartz，1992）。-一些操作被禁止了，如就業(yè)貸款。而戈恩卻廣泛支持，而且似乎不可避免的要實施一些措施，以應付預期風險。同時上述措施與代理理論原則的一致性表明監(jiān)管，激勵路線和經(jīng)理的控制，可以很容易被察覺，以盡量減少代理問題（托西，2008）。然而，監(jiān)測和報告的復雜性，因為前者大幅增加成本的措施，他們添加相關的關聯(lián)方交易的潛在經(jīng)濟損失由于財富轉(zhuǎn)移，收益管理等以及相關的機會成本通常被廣泛忽略。整體性能產(chǎn)生負面影響可以被合理地假定，可以不把這個看做某種交易，對此可能有限追索權(quán)的限定。有效交易假設跟以往的做法相反，高效率的交易假設關聯(lián)方交易代表完善的業(yè)務交流，能有效地履行該公司潛在的經(jīng)濟需求。因此，他們并不損害股東的利益，并在信息安排不完整的情況下成為一個有效的合同。然而，可能的利益也許有：-締約各方代表執(zhí)行局委員促進更好地協(xié)調(diào)不同的活動，更快的反饋或更多的見解成就；-更深以及更加熟悉地相互了解能夠證明交易是不公平可行的或為雙方創(chuàng)造更便利的條款及條件；-提出的問題可能得到緩解；-這些交易可能還提供首席執(zhí)行官兼董事現(xiàn)金報酬或補償他們增加的風險；關聯(lián)方交易的內(nèi)部交易代表認為，替代合約或市場交流能夠降低交易成本，克服困難損害生產(chǎn)與交易成本理論是一致的（科斯，1937年，威廉姆森，1985年），許多研究已經(jīng)提供了證據(jù)。特別是，在沒有有效的資本，勞動力和產(chǎn)品市場的條件下，像許多發(fā)展中國家一樣，信息和代理問題以及市場不完善，體制環(huán)境風險的增加關系著公司的運作，而集團內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)的交易可能會提供一個更好的財政資源，規(guī)模效益，更容易獲得融資以及獲得更多的機會，影響分配額的增加等等。因此，內(nèi)部資本市場可能會產(chǎn)生與整個集團有利的影響，當外部資金匱乏，（Khanna和Palepu，1997年）規(guī)模和范圍不確定的情況下，必須克服貧困地區(qū)阻礙發(fā)達地區(qū)生產(chǎn)的情況，并在這些地區(qū)進行更容易和有利可圖（Fisman和康納，2004年）的投資，分享與現(xiàn)有的集團財務資源有關的技術技能和廣告有助于實現(xiàn)盈利補充低效的資本市場，降低交易成本（昌和香港，2000年； Moscariello，2007）。然而，還沒有最終的證據(jù)證明（Khanna和Palepu，2000年）（張和香港，2000）內(nèi)部交易可以產(chǎn)生額外利潤。此外，代理問題仍然在形成利益集團所屬的成本及相關問題減少國內(nèi)市場產(chǎn)生有利影響的作用（Claeessens和風扇，2002年； Claessens等人，2006年）。不同的概念框架：一些指引 上述理論的不一致或不足提供了幾乎截然相反的解釋，他們無法應付各種可能的情況。利益沖突理論似乎對社會需求可能更敏感，如保護少數(shù)群體和資本市場的公平和效率。毫不奇怪，其解決方案是與這些交易和周圍的政治氣氛日益關注的問題相一致的。可以說，在一定程度上，這種觀點以合法更具約束力，披露和監(jiān)督要求的方式提供了一個“政治理由”。不過，這種做法削弱了明顯的缺陷或漏洞，做以下簡要探討。經(jīng)驗證據(jù)也始終沒有和預期的完成結(jié)果一致。正如前面看到的那樣，文獻支持矛盾的結(jié)論正在被逐步揭示，而不是空白的領域，一個區(qū)別空白領域的復雜領域正在被作為特殊的對待。13