稅收、交易權(quán)和交易成本[文獻(xiàn)翻譯]

最新 精品 Word 歡迎下載 可修改原文：Taxes, Tradable Rights and Transaction CostsWith respect to market-based policy approaches, it is a widely held view that corrective taxation entails substantial. This conclusion only holds if set-up costs are singled out. It is argued that the prevalence of transaction costs is largely dependent on the design of the policy instrument, respectively the tax base or the trading regime chosen. Comparative analysis further shows that a cap-and-trade program of emission permits distributed for free, traded on a brokered market and monitored upstream is not only more effective, but also likely to entail fewer transaction costs than environmental taxes. Any attempt, in turn, to save the huge information, enforcement and compliance costs incurred by corrective taxation impairs its efficacy by severing the link between the environmental externality and the tax base.Basically, there exist four policy instruments to curb pollution: direct regulation, environmental liability, ecological taxes and tradable emission rights. The latter two are similar in the sense that they are market-based instruments that use the price system to internalize environmental damages. They compare favorably to the two former approaches because they are flexible and cost-effective as formally demonstrated. Despite their similarity, most countries rely on taxes instead of tradable permits. Since the Kyoto Protocol, however, there is a renewed political and scientific interest in tradable emission rights. With this rise in public interest, the alleged complexity of the system and subsequent transaction costs are unremittingly criticized. In this article, we will assess the merits of this criticism.Taxes typically carry both an incentive and financial effect. Although the purpose of Pigouvian taxation is to bring about a change in activity and pollution levels, environmental taxes can be easily conceived as just an alternative source of revenue for the government. Assuming a low treasury preference, public support may have to be won by an environmental tax reform that balances environmental tax revenues with tax cuts elsewhere or provides tax incentives for pollution reduction. However, this does not solve the systemic information problem. When environmental taxes are set too low, suboptimal emission reductions will result. Alternatively, high taxes will cause unwarranted deadweight losses. Moreover, it has been recognized that the mere existence of an externality does not in itself merit corrective state action. Coase (1960) convincingly argued that, under certain circumstances, the reduction of spill-over effects can be achieved via private negotiations. This insight has led to the development of a new policy instrument.Transaction costs: The quest for taxonomyTransaction costs are nowadays frequently invoked to explain institutional, non-market phenomena. Many different definitions appear in the literature, offering various conceptual insights that have not been translated yet into standard cost categories. Therefore, we first take another look at the different definitions offered by various authors from which we will derive an operational and possibly complete taxonomy.The concept of transaction costs was introduced by Coase (1937) to explain why firms exist as an alternative for organizing economic activity by means of exchange transactions across the market. The answer is that firms arise because there are substantial costs involved in using the market. Many different definitions appear in the literature, offering various conceptual insights that have not been translated yet into standard cost categories. Coase was not very explicit about what he meant by these transaction costs. Since different types of costs may be borne by different players at different points in the policy process, a proper classification of transaction cost categories is important to assure that all relevant costs are accounted for. When complete, transaction cost taxonomy may also be helpful in improving policy design and management. According to Dahlman (1979), transaction costs include:search and information costs,bargaining and decision-making costs, monitoring and enforcement costs.The economic rationale of institutions lies in the reduction of those costs. This must be interpreted carefully. However, although institutions are, in principle, designed to reduce transaction costs by diminishing uncertainty, they may not succeed so. New or changing institutions may generate, at any point in time, inconsistencies between competing institutions as well as uncertainty over future institutional changes which, in turn, are likely to lead to increasing transaction costs (Meyer, 2022). Milgrom and Roberts (1992) distinguish between two categories of transaction costs. The first type arises from information asymmetries and incompleteness of contracts among parties. The second type stems from imperfect commitments or opportunistic behavior of parties.The OECD has classified transaction costs into two categories:non-policy related transaction costs, which are incurred by parties to voluntary (market) transactions, policy related transaction costs, which are associated with the implementation of policies.The former include the costs associated with gathering information, negotiating prices, ascertaining qualities, establishing exclusion mechanisms, organizing collective actions and so on. The latter cover the costs incurred by government in gathering information, planning and designing policies, collecting revenues, distributing payments, and monitoring the outcome of policies.According to Furubotn and Richter (1997), transaction costs involve the use of real resources that could be deployed alternatively elsewhere in the economy or the socioeconomic system. Transaction costs are pervasive at all levels and types of activity and inactivity and comprise the costs of establishing, maintaining, adapting, regulating, monitoring and enforcing rules as well as executing transactions. Interestingly, the opportunity costs of misallocated activities also fit into the category of transaction costs. They make a distinction between three types of transaction costs :the costs of using the market (market transaction costs),the costs of exercising the right to give orders within the organization (managerial transaction costs),the costs of running and adjusting a political system (political transaction costs).Their taxonomy is the most complete to be found in the literature and comprises the costs of using the markets as introduced by Coase (1937), the managerial costs put forward by Williamson (1985) and the institutional costs discussed by North (1990). The Furubotn-Richter approach also absorbs the distinction made by Mullins and Baron (1997) between direct transaction costs (e.g. to initiate and complete a trade) and opportunity costs (e.g. the loss of time and resources due to delay or managerial supervision). Furthermore, transactions entail costs ex ante (e.g. the search and information costs and the costs of negotiating and forming a contract or agreement) and ex post (e.g. the costs of monitoring and enforcing a contract or agreement). In practice, however, ex ante costs often coincide with fixed costs and ex post costs with variable costs. It is important to recognize that the two types of costs are usually interdependent. Any attempt to reduce the former may affect the latter.Table 1. Transaction cost taxonomyTransaction costs Fixed (ex ante) Variable (ex post) Market Information costs Insurance costs Search costs Signaling costs Negotiation costs Contract costs Managerial Set-up costs Monitoring cost Enforcement costs Bonding costs Political Lobbying costs Operational costs Public support costs Compliance costs Enacting costs Delay costsSource: Based on Furutbotn and Richter (1997).In Table 1, we offer an extended classification based on the Furubotn-Richter taxonomy that is thought to include all relevant types of transaction costs. This scheme will be used for policy evaluation in the next paragraph.Comparative transaction costs analysisFrom an ecological and economic perspective, it is clear that tradable emission rights outperform environmental taxes, but the crux of the former system seems the transaction costs it entails. Rao (2021) has suggested that the systems of market based emissions trading; even the well-developed programs in the United States, still have a long way to go before being effective in any sense because of excessive transaction costs. However, there exists no empirical evidence that transaction costs have prevented trading or significantly affected prices of permits in the United States . Moreover, the occurrence of high transaction costs in emissions trading does not imply that environmental taxation is any less susceptible. As Krutilla (1999) pointed out, the environmental economics literature still lacks a comparative assessment of transaction costs.Environmental taxesCorrective taxation is itself not costless. All relevant transaction costs associated with environmental taxes will be discussed first. 1. Legislative costs. The decision on the instrument to be applied in environmental policy is formally the competence of the legislator who is supposed to act to further the public interest. But politicians are also influenced by various interest groups like the polluting industry, environmental organizations and bureaucracy.2. Information costs. The literature on environmental tax policy leaves room for a possible net welfare gain of corrective taxation. Containing the amount of information, accuracy relates to business decisions, however, some information is difficult to obtain. Information costs may further rise when differentiated taxes are to be implemented in accordance， enterprises get maximum benefit from. Finally, environmental pollution is often the result of accidents. Uncertainty also complicates the correct assessment of expected social costs.3. Search (planning) costs. First-best analysis expects the tax authority to use personalized. taxes and lump sum transfers since they do not bring additional distortions to the economy. Search costs can be somewhat mitigated, though, when the source can be linked to the cause of pollution. Taxing substances entails fewer information and search costs compared to personalized or incentive taxation. Search costs can be further reduced when the tax units are already identified. 4. Set-up costs. With the rise of the modern welfare state, the scope of taxation has increased dramatically. Consequently, governments have set up large agencies to administer and collect all types of direct and indirect taxes that touch upon almost every aspect of human life (consumption, production, business initiative, work, home and even death). If the new environmental taxes can be levied and collected by an established tax agency, set-up costs are negligible and sunk.5. Operational costs. Negligible set-up costs do not imply that the costs of tax administration are low. Environmental taxation requires specialized personnel that gather the information discussed above, identifies the correct tax base, determines the optimal tax rate, feeds that information into the existing tax system and, if revenues are earmarked, collects the tax money and establishes a special fund. Although overhead costs can be spread among taxpayers, the costs of operating the tax administration are certainly not negligible and rising with the complexity of the tax law.6. Negotiation costs. Although corporations and tax authorities often negotiate tax deals that may include environmental taxes and personalized tax deductibles for abatement investments, it is assumed that these negotiations are restricted to larger companies and that no tax bargaining occurs among tax subjects. As a matter of fact, taxation is compulsory precisely to eradicate these transaction costs. Hence, negotiation costs are relatively small.7. Contract costs. No costs are incurred as a result of contracting over environmental.8. Monitoring and enforcement costs. Because polluters want to reduce the tax burden, they can choose to invest in abatement equipment (if the pay-off exceeds the tax payments), to reduce their polluting activities, to switch to non-taxed activities or to try and escape tax payments. Clearly, the environmental tax administration has to perform costly monitoring activities to ensure compliance and enforce tax payments. It is important to distinguish three different problems: tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax delinquency. While tax evasion is a fraudulent effort to escape a tax obligation, tax avoidance occurs when a taxpayer adapts his behavior in a lawful manner so as to minimize tax payments. Tax delinquency refers to a (temporary) failure to pay the tax obligation.9. Compliance costs. Administrative mechanisms to prevent tax evasion also lead to costs made by the taxpayers to comply with the rules. The main source of compliance costs involves recordkeeping and banking operations. Compliance costs can be substantial and are estimated, for example, at 7 percent of total income tax revenue.Conclusion： From this analysis, two main conclusions can be drawn. First, the transaction costs of environmental taxation are conditional upon the selected tax base. Although set-up costs are relatively low when drawing upon existing tax administrations, the enforcement and compliance costs are likely to be substantial. The latter costs are determined by the tax rules complexity which, in turn, seems a consequence of the linkage principle. The more accurately the tax base is defined, the higher the information costs and subsequent monitoring, enforcement and compliance cost. Secondly, there appears a trade-off between transaction costs and the efficacy of environmental taxes. Corrective taxation, though desirable in principle, may entail prohibitively high transaction costs that can only be reduced to some extent by sacrificing its original goal viz. matching private and social costs.Source: Lode Vereeck,2022.”Taxes, Tradable Rights and Transaction Costs”, European Journal of Law and Economics No. 20,P199-223.譯文：稅收、交易權(quán)和交易成本關(guān)于以市場為基礎(chǔ)的政策方針，普遍認(rèn)為需要糾正的稅務(wù)量很大。這個結(jié)論只能在強(qiáng)調(diào)設(shè)置成本的情況下成立。我們認(rèn)為，交易成本的盛行在很大程度上源于選擇的計(jì)稅基數(shù)或貿(mào)易體制。進(jìn)一步的對比分析表明，排放限額和交易許權(quán)的免費(fèi)發(fā)放，在促成市場交易和上游監(jiān)管上不僅更有效，而且所需要的交易成本可能比環(huán)境稅更少。反過來，環(huán)境外部性和計(jì)稅基礎(chǔ)聯(lián)系的加強(qiáng)，會削弱任何試圖以糾正稅收來節(jié)省巨大的信息、執(zhí)行和遵從管理費(fèi)用的方法的效率。基本上有四種政策工具可以減少污染，它們分別是：直接管理、環(huán)境責(zé)任、生態(tài)稅收和排放權(quán)交易。后兩者是相似的，因?yàn)樗鼈兌际腔谑袌?，使用改變價格體系的手段來減少環(huán)境損失。它們比前兩個的做法更受人喜愛，是因?yàn)樗鼈冹`活且具有成本效益。雖然它們相似，但是大多數(shù)國家依靠的是稅收而不是交易許權(quán)。自從京都議定書后，國家對交易排放權(quán)產(chǎn)生了新的興趣。隨著公共利益的提高，復(fù)雜的系統(tǒng)和其隨后的交易成本受到了不斷的質(zhì)疑。稅收通常既有激勵的影響，又能產(chǎn)生財(cái)務(wù)效應(yīng)。盡管皮古稅的目的是為了有關(guān)活動的減少和污染程度的變化，但是環(huán)境稅通常被理解為只是政府替代收入的來源。如果國庫偏好低，公眾可能支持環(huán)境稅制的改革。他們認(rèn)為可以用稅收減免政策來平衡環(huán)境稅收或者運(yùn)用到其他地方來激勵污染的減少。然而，這并不能解決系統(tǒng)信息的問題。當(dāng)環(huán)境稅收過低時，欠佳減排的問題就會產(chǎn)生。另外，高稅收將導(dǎo)致不必要的損失。此外，人們認(rèn)識到少量存在的某些外部性原因并不值得讓國家糾正稅收?？扑梗?960）認(rèn)為，在某些情況下，溢出效應(yīng)的減少可以通過私下談判達(dá)成。這種認(rèn)識導(dǎo)致了一項(xiàng)新的政策工具的發(fā)展。交易成本分類如今交易成本經(jīng)常用來解釋非市場現(xiàn)象。在文獻(xiàn)中出現(xiàn)的許多不同定義，為很多還沒有被翻譯成標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的成本項(xiàng)目的概念提供了認(rèn)識。因此，我們應(yīng)該從另外的角度看看不同作者給出的不同定義，這為我們完成分類提供了可操作性。科斯（1937）認(rèn)為交易成本的概念解釋了為什么其在企業(yè)外匯交易過程中是不可替代的，即企業(yè)活動因涉及市場交易所產(chǎn)生的巨額費(fèi)用。許多文獻(xiàn)中也總結(jié)出了各種定義，并且對于那些尚未被歸類的費(fèi)用有著不同的見解。但科斯也明確地表示，他所說的不一定就是交易成本的具體意思。不同類型的企業(yè)成本組成并不相同，在不同的政策過程中，交易費(fèi)用的類別是根據(jù)在成本費(fèi)用中所承擔(dān)的重要程度而定的。明確交易成本的分類也可以對改進(jìn)政策設(shè)計(jì)和加強(qiáng)管理有所幫助。據(jù)達(dá)爾曼（1979）指出，交易成本包括：搜索和信息成本，談判和決策成本，監(jiān)督和執(zhí)法成本。為了減少這些成本費(fèi)用，必須將其各組成部分解釋清楚。盡管通過不確定性的原則，各組成部分間因相互協(xié)調(diào)而減少了部分交易成本，但有時也可能不會成功。無論在任何時候，新產(chǎn)品或更新的產(chǎn)品與原有產(chǎn)品之間都存在競爭矛盾，而變革的不確定性，很可能反過來導(dǎo)致交易成本的增加（邁耶，2022）。米爾格羅姆和羅伯次（1992）將交易成本劃分為兩類。第一類是由于信息的不對稱性和合同中條款的不完整性產(chǎn)生的，第二類則是因?yàn)槌兄Z的不完善或者說當(dāng)事方的機(jī)會主義行為而產(chǎn)生的。另外，經(jīng)濟(jì)組織將交易成本分為兩類：非相關(guān)的交易成本，雙方自愿交易（市場政策）導(dǎo)致的相關(guān)成本，政策相關(guān)的交易成本，執(zhí)行有關(guān)政策所需要付出的成本。前者包括了收集資料、進(jìn)行議價、確定素質(zhì)、建立排斥機(jī)制、組織集體行動等過程。后者包括了由政府承擔(dān)的信息收集的成本、規(guī)劃和制定政策、繳費(fèi)收入、分期付款和政策監(jiān)測下的結(jié)果。呂博騰和瑞切爾（1997）則認(rèn)為，交易成本是指在經(jīng)濟(jì)制度下，所涉及的可以真正調(diào)動資源所產(chǎn)生的費(fèi)用。交易成本涉及很多方面，包括設(shè)備的建立、維護(hù)、調(diào)整和規(guī)范，以及執(zhí)行并監(jiān)督交易活動中各項(xiàng)規(guī)則運(yùn)用的全部過程。有趣的是，在錯誤配置下的交易活動所產(chǎn)生的成本也能歸入到適合的機(jī)會成本當(dāng)中。他們根據(jù)交易成本之間的區(qū)別也將之分為三類：使用市場（市場交易成本）的費(fèi)用，組織內(nèi)部發(fā)布命令權(quán)的費(fèi)用（管理交易成本），運(yùn)行和調(diào)整政治系統(tǒng)的費(fèi)用（政治交易成本）。這種分類是最完整的，他們的文獻(xiàn)中包括了科斯（1937）的有關(guān)介紹、威廉森（1985）提出的管理費(fèi)用的知識點(diǎn)以及羅斯(1990)提出有關(guān)市場體制方面的成本費(fèi)用的論點(diǎn)。呂博騰和瑞切爾的分類方法里也涵蓋了穆林斯和拜倫（1997）所作的直接交易成本（如啟動和完成交易）和機(jī)會成本（如由于延誤或監(jiān)督管理損失的時間和資源）的區(qū)別。此外，交易成本需要區(qū)分是在事前（如形成合同或協(xié)議之前搜索信息的費(fèi)用和談判的成本）還是事后（如監(jiān)測和強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行合同或協(xié)議的費(fèi)用）。但在實(shí)踐中，事前成本往往配合著固定費(fèi)用，而事后成本則為可變費(fèi)用。重要的是要認(rèn)識到，這兩種費(fèi)用通常是相互依存的，任何試圖減少前者的舉動都可能會影響到后者。表1.交易成本的分類交易成本 固定（事前） 可變（事后）-市場 -信息成本 -保險費(fèi)用-搜索成本-信號費(fèi)用-談判成本-合同成本-管理 -設(shè)置成本 -監(jiān)測費(fèi)用-執(zhí)行成本-焊接成本-政治 -游說費(fèi)用 -業(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)用-公共支持成本 -遵從成本-頒布成本 -延遲成本來源：根據(jù)呂博騰和瑞切爾（1997）在表1中，我們提供了一個以呂博騰和瑞切爾分類方法為基礎(chǔ)擴(kuò)展的方法，其中包括了所有交易成本的類型。這個將在未來一段時間內(nèi)被論證。交易成本比較分析從生態(tài)和經(jīng)濟(jì)角度來看，很明顯，生態(tài)稅收要優(yōu)于排放權(quán)交易，其中交易成本似乎是以往的制度政策所造成的。堯（2021）表明，交易成本的存在并沒有嚴(yán)重影響或阻礙美國許可證的交易價格。此外，和生態(tài)稅收相比，擁有高排放權(quán)的貿(mào)易活動并不意味著會產(chǎn)生較少的交易成本。生態(tài)稅收稅收本身并非沒有成本，因此首先將所有與環(huán)境稅收有關(guān)的交易費(fèi)用進(jìn)行討論。(1)立法成本；制定有關(guān)政策是以促進(jìn)公眾利益為前提的，所有企業(yè)則應(yīng)在法律權(quán)限范圍內(nèi)采取適當(dāng)?shù)男袆?。但是，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)們也會受到不同利益集團(tuán)的影響，如無污染企業(yè)和環(huán)境保護(hù)組織等。(2)信息成本；提出環(huán)境稅收政策是為了能夠擁有一個稅收凈收益的可能性。信息的含有量、準(zhǔn)確度都關(guān)系到企業(yè)決策的進(jìn)行。然而有的信息是很難獲得的。區(qū)別各種稅收方式，使企業(yè)獲取最大收益，信息成本就可能進(jìn)一步上升。到最后，往往產(chǎn)生讓人意外的結(jié)果-環(huán)境污染。社會的不確定性也使得預(yù)期的成本評估復(fù)雜化了。(3)搜索（計(jì)劃）成本。首先最好的分析預(yù)計(jì)是稅收機(jī)關(guān)使用個性化方式。稅收一次性全額轉(zhuǎn)移是因?yàn)樗鼈儾粫眍~外的經(jīng)濟(jì)負(fù)擔(dān)。盡管來源和污染原因聯(lián)系在一起，但是搜索成本還是可以有所減輕的。同個性化和激勵稅收相比，稅收物質(zhì)需要更少的信息和搜索成本。當(dāng)稅收部門已經(jīng)確定時，搜索成本可以進(jìn)一步減少。(4) 設(shè)置成本。隨著現(xiàn)代福利國家的興起，征稅范圍已大大增加。因此，政府已經(jīng)組建了大型機(jī)構(gòu)來管理和收集所有類型的直接和間接稅，這幾乎觸及了人們生活的方方面面(生產(chǎn)、消費(fèi)、經(jīng)營主動性、工作、家庭，甚至死亡)。如果新的環(huán)境稅可以由建立的稅務(wù)機(jī)關(guān)來征收，設(shè)置和沉沒成本則可以忽略不計(jì)。(5)業(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)用。稅收征管的比率比較低并不意味著設(shè)置成本就可以忽略不計(jì)。環(huán)境稅收需要專門人員收集資料，結(jié)合現(xiàn)行稅制，討論并確定正確的稅基及最優(yōu)稅率，通過征收的稅款設(shè)立特別基金。雖然管理費(fèi)用可以由納稅人負(fù)責(zé)，但稅收經(jīng)營管理的成本仍然不容忽視，其復(fù)雜性也在不斷上升。(6)談判費(fèi)用；企業(yè)和稅收機(jī)關(guān)經(jīng)常對有關(guān)交易的稅收進(jìn)行談判，其中可能包括減少生態(tài)稅收和減免個性化投資的稅收，但這些談判僅限于大公司。事實(shí)上，稅收的強(qiáng)制性正是為了消除這些交易成本。因此，談判的成本相對較小。(7)合同費(fèi)用；任何費(fèi)用支出是對環(huán)境承包的結(jié)果。(8)監(jiān)測和執(zhí)行成本；由于污染者要減輕稅收負(fù)擔(dān)，他們可能選擇減少設(shè)備投資（如薪酬超過付稅），減少污染活動以轉(zhuǎn)變成非征稅活動來試圖逃避交稅。顯然，執(zhí)行稅收征管必須要密集，這樣才能確保人們遵守稅收制度。其中，最重要的就是區(qū)分三種不同的問題：逃稅、避稅和稅收犯罪。逃稅是欺詐性的行為，即努力逃避稅收義務(wù)；避稅是納稅人用合適行為、合法的方式，以盡量減少納稅；稅收犯罪是指（臨時）未履行繳付稅款的義務(wù)。 (9) 遵從成本。行政機(jī)制防止逃稅還會導(dǎo)致由納稅人為遵守規(guī)則付出的成本。遵從成本的主要來源包括記錄和銀行業(yè)務(wù)。遵從成本可能數(shù)量比較大，但是可以被估計(jì)和預(yù)測。比如，占稅收總額的百分之七。 結(jié)論：通過以上的分析，主要可以得出兩個結(jié)論。首先，稅收可以通過交易的成本選擇稅基。雖然稅收的設(shè)置成本相對較低并由現(xiàn)有的稅收當(dāng)局制訂，但要執(zhí)行和遵從成本可能是巨大的。稅收規(guī)則的復(fù)雜性決定了費(fèi)用是可變的，所以，我們可以將它充分利用起來。其次，交易成本和生態(tài)稅收兩者之間似乎可以相互取舍。調(diào)整稅收，雖然可能帶來過高的費(fèi)用，但是能在一定程度上減少其最初的交易成本，也是一種可取的方法。出處：洛德弗瑞克. 稅收、交易權(quán)和交易成本.歐洲法律和經(jīng)濟(jì),2022(20)：P199-223。