金融學(xué)專業(yè) 論文農(nóng)業(yè)銀行股份制改革研究中英文附錄

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1、 畢業(yè)論文 論 文 名 稱 農(nóng)業(yè)銀行股份制改革的障礙及對策研究 學(xué) 生 姓 名 指 導(dǎo) 教 師 專 業(yè) 金融學(xué) 學(xué) 院 金融學(xué)院  附錄一 Functions of Global Commercial Banks Credit Service The primary function

2、 of a global commercial bank, of course, is to accept deposits and lend money. Indeed lending is the cornerstone of global banking activity. Banks is overseas markets may lend money in local currency to local clients out of branches or subsidiaries in foreign countries, funded by local currency depo

3、sits or by local money-market borrowings. For example, Deutsche Bank’s branch in Mexico City may lend pesos to a local car manufacturer, funded by peso deposits in its local branch. This is purely local business, in which the bank competes with domestic banks or with affiliates of other foreign fina

4、ncial institutions. Alternatively, the bank may also engage in cross-border lending, in which a loan is made to a borrower in a country other than the lender’s residence, and is denominated in a currency other than that of the borrower’s currency. According to Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greens

5、pan in 1998, cross-border lending doubled in previous decade. For example, Deutsche Bank’s branch in London may loan U.S dollars to the same car manufacture in Mexico City. This loan is funded by dollars generated worldwide. All lending activities, whether direct or syndicated, should generate re

6、venue for the bank. The spread is akin to gross profit on the loan; it is the difference between the interest the bank earns on the loan and the interest it pays on its own borrowed funds. The spread should be sufficient to cover overhead, risk, and profits. Lending activities can also generate a va

7、riety of fees. One form of lending, for example, is the revolving credit facility. This permits the customer to borrow, or draw, up to a certain maximum amount over an agreed time period under an agreed interest formula. This formula is usually based on the London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR(th

8、e interest rate paid between banks for dollars on deposit in London), plus a margin reflecting the borrower’s creditworthiness. Thus General Motors, for example, might pay LIBOR plus 1/4 percentage point, while Bolivia might pay LIBOR plus 3percetage points. The bank, in turn, earns a commitment fee

9、 for standing ready to lend, whether or not the funds are actually disbursed. As we shall see, bans earn fees from a variety of lending-based services, such as syndicated loans and letters of credit. Syndicated Loan Facilities Syndicated Loan are central tool international banking, widely used

10、by banks to meet customers’ need for large-scale and/or high-risk loans. A syndicated loan is a credit extended by a group of bank to a single customer, usually on common terms. This permits the risk, which might be too large for one bank to accept on its own, to be shared out among a large group of

11、 bank. It also facilitates the extension of credits that would otherwise be too big for one bank to handle. Moreover, the syndication technique enables large and medium-sized regional banks to participate in international lending activities. Syndicated Loans are accompanied by a weighty set of loan

12、documentation and some standard legal agreement. For example, the agreement will usually specify the judgment currency and legal jurisdiction if the parties find it necessary to go to court; it will specify that all creditors are to be treated equally; and it will require the borrower, if a governme

13、nt, to waive its right to sovereign immunity(meaning that the bank can sue the government if necessary). Syndication can be a handsome source of fee revenue for the lead bank or banks. In general, the borrower pays a commitment fee on the funds that are not disbursed, plus interest on the funds t

14、hat are drawn down (usually, LIBOR plus a margin), as well as agent fee. Typically, one or more large bank acts as lead or agent in the facility, gathering information for use in judging the creditworthiness of the borrower organizing the loan, and selling it down to other participating banks. The

15、lead institution must have the ability to market the credit to other financial institutions, and to perform the necessary tasks of structuring and pricing the credit. Chase Manhattan (now J. P. Morgan Chase) has long reigned as the top bank in syndicated lending worldwide, with around 25 percent mar

16、ket share. The notion that syndicated loans reduce risk by sharing it out received a rude awakening in the 1980s, however, Credits to shaky Latin American borrowers, for example, were syndicated widely, often unsophisticated regional institutions with little or no expertise in international lendi

17、ng. There is a tendency for participants in the syndication to replay heavily o the credit analysis of the large, more sophisticated bans, and it is unclear to what extent the lead bank is responsible for the accuracy of the information presented on the borrow. Thus it is not surprising that follow

18、ing a period of fast-paced growth in the 1970s, the syndicated loan market dried up after 1981 as a huge portion of bank resources were redirected into rescheduling problem loans to emerging market borrowers. Many bankers came to believe that the syndication process contributed to problems in unrave

19、ling the Third World debt crisis of the 1980s. Many small, regional banks were clearly in over their heads., and they became a weak link as the rescheduling process unfolded. (Why were local banks in Louisiana and Kentucky lending to Brazil in the first place?) By the mid-1980s, many banks had trans

20、ferred or fired their syndication experts and the bank closed down their syndication departments. The process was accelerated by a tighter international ban regulatory regime, which emerged after the Basel agreement on capital adequacy was announced in1988. This agreement required bans to maintai

21、n a certain ratio capital to loans according to a complex and controversial formula, producing a era of retrenchment for money. For the next few years, international bans were forced to build up their capital bases and were drawn away from private sector lending toward sovereign (loans to government

22、s and public sector entities), which require less allocations of risk capital. As a result, ”club” deals became more popular I the late 1980s. Rather than a syndication of 100 or more banks club deals were put together quietly by a handful of big banks. As the 1980s gave way to 1990s, however t

23、he syndicated loan market began to rise from its ashes. With Third World debt issues resolved and capital adequacy levels healthy once more, banks began looking to rebuild their loan portfolios, while borrowers were eager to take advantage of the bans’ willingness to lend once more. Syndicated loans

24、 can provide large amounts of funding very quickly and easily. They guarantee confidentiality to the borrower, which may be critical if the customer raising funds for a acquisition or merger. Accordingly, by the middle to late 1990s, the revival in international syndicated lending had turned into a

25、boom. The number of new syndicated loans hit a new record I 1996—97, amid increasingly fierce competition among banks to win the coveted (and lucrative) position of lead manager or agent. Spreads on loans to emerging market banks and subinvestment-grade European companies declined to unheard-of l

26、ows. Loans to Czech and South African bans, which would have been doe at around 1.0 percentage point above LIBOR just 18 months earlier, were made at just 0.2 percentage points above LIBOR in 1997. Price differentiation between top-grade and second-tier borrowers, according to some observers, declin

27、ed to dangerously low levels. During 1997 the gap between spreads paid by developed country borrowers ad developing country borrowers almost disappeared. Partly because banks were so keen to win mandates from emerging market borrowers I order to establish new relationships, major mispricing of credi

28、t risk undoubtedly occurred. Bankers insist, though, that they demanded more ancillary, fee-based business to accompany the low-cost loans. Following the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the market for syndicated lending tightened up once more, and some of this mispricing has been corrected. In fa

29、ct the latest development is the use of “market-flex” clauses to protect bankers against some of the risk involved in syndicated lending. These clauses, which were pioneered by Chase in 1997 and became increasingly popular I the next two years, allow lenders to alter the pricing or structure of the

30、la as market condition fluctuate. During 1998 and 1999 spreads also rose sharply, especially on syndicated loans to emerging market countries such as those in Latin America. The strongly rated Chilean electric company, for example was able to borrow at LIBOR plus 0.25 percentage points in early 1998

31、; by year-end, the spread had widened to 2.25 percentage points. In the first half of 1999, volumes in the syndicated loan market soared once more, fueled by a boom in European mergers and acquisitions. Syndicated lending has reemerged as the primary source of finance for mergers and acquisitions

32、, especially in the European market; nearly half of the new syndicated loans worldwide in the first half of 1999 were denominated in the euro European, the new European currency introduced on January 1, 1999. Analysts expect the European syndicated loan market to continue expanding strongly, as long

33、 as merger and acquisition activity continues to expand. Project Finance Project Finance is somewhat less susceptible to the boom-bust cyclicity of syndicated lending, but it too experienced a sharp resurgence in the early to middle 1990s, followed by a dramatic in 1997-98. Project finance ref

34、ers to financing for large-scale capital projects, which are generally very large in scale, log in term and high in risk. “Pure” project financing occurs when the debt is to be serviced only by cash flows attributable to the project itself, without recourse to the project’s “sponsors”. The borrower

35、 is the project itself,. Thus project financing dose not appear o the balance sheet of the sponsors, and it does not affect their financial structure or creditworthiness. From the lender’s point of view, project finance can be a risky proposition indeed. Since the projects are usually long term i

36、n nature, the debt maturities can stretch out even over several decades increasing the riskiness of the credit. Moreover, infrastructure tend to generate cash in local currency, creating currency risk for banks that are lending in dollars. Even worse, revenue earned by local infrastructure companies

37、, such as power companies, may be artificially manipulated by politicians. Thus a central task of bankers involved in project finance is to identify and quantify the risks, and then to allocate them acceptably among the various participants in the project. A list of the risk associated with proje

38、ct finance would include the following: l Resource risk: the possibility that the oil, gas, or minerals expected to be in the ground will not be present in sufficient quantities to service the debt. l Input risk: the chance that the basic viability of the project will be threatened by the unavaila

39、bility or high prices of key inputs such as energy or raw materials. l Completion risk: the risk that the project will be delayed indefinitely, resulting in substantial cost overruns. l Market risk: the risk that future demand for the product will decline. l Operating risk: the risk that even aft

40、er the project becomes operational, costs will change or critical elements such as labor or transportation will be disrupted. l Force majeure: the possibility that-so-called ”acts of God” will occur to disrupt the project, ranging from warfare to weather. l Political risk: the possibility that pol

41、itical conditions surrounding the project will become adverse. l Regulatory risk: the risk that is represented to the project’s completion by change in a government’s rules and regulations pertaining to a certain industry. Such actions as tax hikes prohibition of certain activities, and opening a m

42、arket up to additional competition may negatively affect the outcome of the project as well as jeopardize its ability to repay the loan. International project finance activity boomed the first half of the 1990s, reflecting deregulation, privatization, and rapid economic growth in emerging market

43、countries. The value of loans and bonds raised without official guarantees soared by 53 percent in 1995 alone, driven largely by activity in Asia, where rapid growth was putting severe pressure on the power and transportation infrastructure. As in the syndicated loan market, margins on bank lending

44、 in this sector narrowed sharply as competition intensified, and bankers showed more willingness to assume some of the aforementioned risks. Also, as in the syndicated loan market, project finance activity slowed markedly following the financial crisis of 1997-98, especially in Asian and Latin Ameri

45、can market. Trade Finance Much less “sexy”—and much less risky—than syndications and project finance, trade finance is the bread—and –butter operation of international lending. Indeed, trade finance is the great-granddaddy of international banking. Prior to the 1960s, the international operation

46、s of U.S. banks were mostly limited to financing international trade. Even today, trade financing is an important revenue source for many international banks. The primary instrument of trade finance is the letter of credit(L\C) which allows the credit of the bank to be substituted for that of the cu

47、stomer. An L\C is a draft drawn by a company or individual on a bank, ordering it to pay a specified amount at a specified time accepted by the bank to a named individual (or the bearer). In effect, the bank promises that payment will be made on the specified date. This facilitates international tra

48、de between a buyer and seller who otherwise would not be willing to ship goods without some guarantee that payment will be made. Banks change a fee for L\Cs contingent liabilities most will never require the ban t make a payment. There are other types of L\C as well. A standby letter of credit ma

49、y be issued to reassure creditors that the bank will stand ready to make payment if the original borrower is unable. Companies routinely obtain standby L\Cs to back up their commercial paper offerings for instance. A performance letter of credit obliges the bank to guarantee that its customer will p

50、erform some service as required; if the customer fails to provide the service, the bank will be forced to make restitution. All letter of credit provide fee income for the bank. Commercial Paper Commercial paper, or CP, is a standard financing technique for U.S. corporations. It refers to shor

51、t-term promissory notes issued by strong corporate borrowers to sophisticated investors, usually other corporations, pension funds, mutual funds, and banks . Most commercial paper is issued for very short maturities, typically 90 days, and is rolled over at maturity. The issuing corporations is exp

52、ected to provide a commercial bank loan backup facility to support its paper in the (unlikely) event of a market disturbance that might disrupt rollovers. While the commercial paper market has its origins in the United States, a lively Euro commercial paper market has sprung up as well, primarily fo

53、cused in London. Commercial paper is essentially a substitute for ban loans, although bankers do participate in the CP market both as underwriters and guarantors. 附錄二 全球商業(yè)銀行的功能 信貸服務(wù) 全球商業(yè)銀行的最主要職能是接受存款并發(fā)放貸款。事實上，貸款是全球銀行業(yè)務(wù)的基石。在海外市場上，銀行可以通過自己的海外分行或附屬行

54、向當(dāng)?shù)仡櫩吞峁┊?dāng)?shù)刎泿诺馁J款，資金主要來源于當(dāng)?shù)刎泿诺拇婵詈驮诋?dāng)?shù)刎泿攀袌錾系慕杩睢＠?德意志銀行在墨西哥城的分行利用在當(dāng)?shù)匚{的比索存款，向當(dāng)?shù)匾患移囍圃鞆S商提供比索貸款。這是完全意義上的當(dāng)?shù)貥I(yè)務(wù)，在這一過程中德意志銀行的競爭對手來自于本土銀行或其他外資銀行在當(dāng)?shù)氐姆中小? 與此相對，銀行可以進(jìn)行跨國界借款，即貸款人向所在國以外的借款人發(fā)放貸款，而且所貸貨幣是所在國本幣之外的外幣。根據(jù)美聯(lián)儲主席Alan Greenspan1998年的講話，跨國界借款在此前的10年翻了一番。例如，德意志銀行的倫敦分行可以向墨西哥城的同一家汽車制造廠商提供美元貸款。這一貸款的資金來源于德意志銀行在全球范圍的

55、美元業(yè)務(wù)。 所有的借款活動，無論是直接貸款還是辛迪加貸款，應(yīng)該為銀行產(chǎn)生收益。利息之間的差額就相當(dāng)于貸款的毛利：它等于銀行對貸款受到的利息減去它借款所付的利息利差收益應(yīng)包括一般管理費用，風(fēng)險管理費用和利潤。借貸活動同時可以產(chǎn)生各種手續(xù)費。例如，有一種形式的貸款，稱為循環(huán)貸款安排。此類貸款可以允許客戶在商定的時期內(nèi)在商定的利率安排之下，借貸或累積借貸某筆資金，借款總額到某一最高金額上限為止。這一利率安排通常以倫敦同業(yè)銀行拆放利率，或稱LIBOR(銀行之間使用的在倫敦的美元存款的利率)為基礎(chǔ)，再加上一個由借款者的信用級別決定的差額。比如，通用汽車公司的借款利率是LIBOR再加上0.25個百分點；

56、而玻利維亞政府的借款利率可能高達(dá)LIBOR再加上3個百分點。因此，在循環(huán)信貸安排中，不管最終是否發(fā)放貸款，銀行將為時刻準(zhǔn)備貸款而收取承諾費。所以我們可以看到，銀行可以從各種各樣的貸款服務(wù)中收取費用，比如辛迪加貸款和信用證服務(wù)。 辛迪加貸款安排 辛迪加貸款是國際銀行業(yè)的核心工具之一，銀行廣泛應(yīng)用這種方式來滿足顧客的大額或高風(fēng)險的貸款要求。一項辛迪加貸款通常指一組銀行同時向同一顧客發(fā)放的貸款，貸款期限相同。這樣，原本對一家銀行來講過高的信貸風(fēng)險就由數(shù)家銀行一同來提供資金。此外辛迪加貸款安排可以使大中型的地方銀行也參與到國際銀行業(yè)務(wù)中來。辛迪加貸款一般需要簽訂一整套的合同文本和法律協(xié)議。例如，協(xié)

57、議中要規(guī)定結(jié)算貨幣和所適用的法律，這樣雙方即使對簿公堂也有律可依；協(xié)議還要規(guī)定對所有的貸款人要一視同仁；此外，它還要規(guī)定，在政府作為借款人的情況下，要放棄其主權(quán)豁免（這意味著，如果需要的話，銀行可以向政府提起訴訟）. 辛迪加貸款(或銀團(tuán)貸款)可以為牽頭銀行或全體銀行提供豐厚的手續(xù)費收入?？傊杩钊藢槲词褂玫男庞妙~度支付承諾費，加上為使用的貸款支付的利息（通常是LIBOR加上一個利息差額），以及一筆代理費用。典型的做法是，一家或幾家大銀行作為牽頭銀行或代理銀行，搜集有用的信息來判斷借款者的信用級別，組織貸款，并把貸款份額再出售給其他參與的銀行。牽頭銀行必須要有能力將貸款銷售給其他金融機(jī)構(gòu)，

58、完成必要的組織工作并為之定價。大通曼哈頓（現(xiàn)在的J.P.摩根大通）在全球范圍內(nèi)的辛迪加貸款中一直占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位，占有大約25%的市場份額。 然而，辛迪加貸款分散風(fēng)險的提法在20世紀(jì)80年代受到了嚴(yán)重的警告。例如，在局勢動蕩的拉美國家，國際銀行貸款絕大部分都是辛迪加性質(zhì)的，而且借款人大多是不成熟的區(qū)域性機(jī)構(gòu)，對國際借款的必要技術(shù)所知寥寥，或干脆一無所知。參加辛迪加的銀行大多嚴(yán)重依賴大銀行所提供的信用分析，大銀行固然技術(shù)上更加精熟，但誰也不知道他們掌握的借款人信息究竟有多大的準(zhǔn)確度。 因而，經(jīng)歷20世紀(jì)70年代的快速增長期之后，辛迪加貸款到1981年后逐漸近于枯竭也是意料之中的事情，這種貸款安排

59、導(dǎo)致國際銀行業(yè)花費很大一部分資源對新興市場借款人進(jìn)行債務(wù)重組。很多銀行家在解讀20世紀(jì)80年代發(fā)生在第三世界的債務(wù)危機(jī)時，都相信辛迪加貸款起到了推波助瀾的作用。很多的小型，地區(qū)性銀行都不堪重負(fù)，它們已經(jīng)成為了國際債務(wù)重組過程中一個脆弱的鏈條。（當(dāng)時路易斯安那或肯塔基的銀行為什么要向巴西貸款呢？）到80年代中期，很多銀行里的辛迪加貸款專家要么轉(zhuǎn)行要么被解雇，而銀行中的辛迪加貸款部門紛紛關(guān)門。 在1988年巴塞爾協(xié)議對銀行資本充足率作出規(guī)定后，國際銀行監(jiān)管規(guī)則趨于嚴(yán)格，使辛迪加貸款萎縮的過程加快。巴塞爾協(xié)議要求銀行依據(jù)一套而且有爭議的公式，對所放貸款保持一定的資本比率，這使國際銀行業(yè)過了一段緊日

60、子。在隨后數(shù)年內(nèi)，國際銀行必須建立其資本基礎(chǔ)，而且從向私人部門貸款變?yōu)橹鳈?quán)貸款（向政府和公共部門貸款），后者所需的風(fēng)險資本較少。因此，“俱樂部協(xié)議”在20世紀(jì)80年代末非常流行。與辛迪加貸款動輒涉及上百家甚至更多數(shù)目的銀行相比，俱樂部協(xié)議只是由幾家大銀行協(xié)商實施。 但是，當(dāng)80年代過去，90年代來臨時，辛迪加貸款猶如鳳凰涅磐重新興起。隨著第三世界債務(wù)問題的解決，銀行資本充足率水平又恢復(fù)正常，銀行開始重新審視自己的貸款組合，同時借款人也想再次利用銀行的貸款意愿而得到資金。辛迪加貸款能夠快速簡便地提供大量的資金；貸款銀行為借款方保守秘密，如果借款的目的在于收購和兼并，保密的承諾就顯得格外的重要。

61、因此，到90年代中期，國際辛迪加貸款從復(fù)興走向繁榮。 銀行之間為爭奪令人艷羨而且利潤豐厚的牽頭或代理銀行地位展開了激烈的競爭，因此新興的辛迪加貸款總額到1996至1997年創(chuàng)造了紀(jì)錄。同時對新興市場銀行和歐洲的次可投資級公司利差貸款低到了前所未聞的地步。以捷克和南非銀行的貸款為例，18個月前的利率還是LIBOR加上1.0個百分點，到1997年已經(jīng)低到了HIBOR加0.2個百分點。有觀察家認(rèn)為，當(dāng)時最高信用級別和次一級別的借款者之間，貸款的價差已經(jīng)低到了相當(dāng)危險的地步。 在1997年的亞洲金融危機(jī)后，辛迪加貸款市場再度趨于緊張。某種程度上這種定價差得到了糾正。實際上，市場上最近的發(fā)展是運用“

62、市場調(diào)控”的法則來保護(hù)銀行家們免受辛迪加貸款的風(fēng)險。1997年該法則由大通曼哈頓銀行首次提出，其后越發(fā)流行。其內(nèi)容是允許貸款人按照市場條件的變化改變價格或貸款結(jié)構(gòu)。在1998年到1999年貸款利差也急劇加大，在對拉美等新興市場國家的辛迪加貸款之中這一點特別明顯。以信用級別很高的智利電力公司為例，該公司在1998年初還可以按LIBOR加0.25個百分點來借款，到年底，利差竟達(dá)到了2.25個百分點。 在1999年的下半年，受到歐洲兼并和收購活動的推動，辛迪加貸款的數(shù)量再次高漲。在全球，特別是歐洲市場，辛迪加貸款再次成為購并活動的主要融資資源；1999年1月1日，歐洲統(tǒng)一貨幣——歐元誕生以后，該年

63、度世界上幾乎一半的辛迪加貸款是用歐元來完成的。分析家們認(rèn)為：只要兼并收購活動繼續(xù)，歐洲辛迪加貸款還將會強(qiáng)勁增長。 項目融資 相對于辛迪加貸款的膨脹——收縮的周期效應(yīng)，項目融資不太呈現(xiàn)大起大落的波動。但是從20世紀(jì)90年代初到90年代中期，項目融資也經(jīng)歷了一個迅速恢復(fù)，緊接著到1997——1998年又急劇收縮的過程。項目融資是指大型資本項目的融資，其通常特點是規(guī)模大，期限長而且風(fēng)險高?！凹冺椖咳谫Y”是指只用項目本身產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流來支付本息，而不需要向贊助商求助。此時的借款人是項目本身，所以項目融資不出現(xiàn)在贊助商的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上，也不影響贊助商的財務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)和信用級別。 事實上，從貸款人的觀點來看，

64、可能認(rèn)為項目融資的風(fēng)險是相當(dāng)大的。因為這些項目一般都具有長期性，債務(wù)期限可能長達(dá)幾十年，必然會增加信用風(fēng)險。此外，基礎(chǔ)建設(shè)融資產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)及流一般都是當(dāng)?shù)刎泿?，這就給用美元借貸的銀行增加了外匯風(fēng)險。更有甚者，從當(dāng)?shù)鼗A(chǔ)建設(shè)比如電力公司中產(chǎn)生的利潤收入，可能會受政客們操縱。因此參與項目融資的銀行家必須以辨別和控制風(fēng)險為中心任務(wù)，然后再把風(fēng)險在項目的參與者之間進(jìn)行合理的分配。 和項目融資有關(guān)的風(fēng)險包括以下種類： l 資源風(fēng)險：指在資源開發(fā)項目中，底下蘊(yùn)藏的石油，天然氣或其他礦物沒有達(dá)到償還債務(wù)所需的儲量。 l 投入風(fēng)險：指在開發(fā)項目中，由于主要投入的物資比如動力或原材料的價格過高或可使用的數(shù)量有

65、限，導(dǎo)致項目的基本可行性受到影響。 l 完成風(fēng)險：指項目無限期拖延，導(dǎo)致成本大大超標(biāo)。 l 市場風(fēng)險：未來產(chǎn)品的需求可能會下降。 l 經(jīng)營風(fēng)險：此風(fēng)險是指在項目投入運行后，項目成本可能發(fā)生變化，或像勞動力或運輸?shù)汝P(guān)鍵因素受到破壞。 l 不可抗力：發(fā)生所謂“上帝的行為”（指從戰(zhàn)爭到天氣等各種不可抗拒的因素），而導(dǎo)致項目運營被迫中斷的可能。 l 政治風(fēng)險：指項目所處環(huán)境的政治條件發(fā)生不利變化的可能性。 l 監(jiān)管風(fēng)險：由于與某一行業(yè)有關(guān)的政府法規(guī)和規(guī)定變化對項目的完成所構(gòu)成的風(fēng)險。例如稅收的增加對某種活動的禁止以及對更多的競爭者開放市場等行動，都可能對項目的收益帶來消極的影響或是危及項目

66、的還貸能力。 20世紀(jì)90年代的上半葉，國際項目融資取得了很大的發(fā)展，這也反映了新興市場國家的放松監(jiān)管和私有化進(jìn)程以及經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展。僅1995年一年間，非官方擔(dān)保的貸款和債券的總價值增加了53%之多。其中亞洲的發(fā)展起了主要的促進(jìn)作用，由于該地區(qū)的經(jīng)濟(jì)快速增長，也就給動力和運輸基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的發(fā)展施加了巨大的壓力。如同辛迪加貸款市場，銀行借貸的利差隨著競爭日趨激烈而急劇縮小，銀行家對承擔(dān)上述的某些風(fēng)險也表現(xiàn)了更過的愿望。與辛迪加貸款市場的另一相同點是，在1997到1998的金融危機(jī)之后，項目融資的發(fā)展也明顯減緩，在亞洲和拉美市場更是如此。 貿(mào)易融資 貿(mào)易金融遠(yuǎn)不如辛迪加貸款和項目融資那么迷人，當(dāng)然風(fēng)險也要小的多。貿(mào)易金融是國際金融領(lǐng)域的日常業(yè)務(wù)，實際上也是國際銀行業(yè)的“祖師爺”。20世紀(jì)60年代以前，美國銀行的國際業(yè)務(wù)大部分都局限于為國際貿(mào)易融資。直到今天對很多的國際銀行來說，貿(mào)易金融仍是一個重要的利潤來源。貿(mào)易金融的首要工具就是信用證（L\C），它允許銀行本身的信用被某位顧客的信用所替代。信用證是某個企業(yè)或個人向銀行開具的書面文件，要求銀行在銀行接受的前提下，在某一特定時間向某