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中英文資料外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的評(píng)價(jià)及控制的文獻(xiàn)綜述中國(guó)從資本市場(chǎng)建立開始，上市公司也隨之不斷地發(fā)展，上市的公司從行業(yè)、類型到地區(qū)、規(guī)模都呈現(xiàn)多樣化趨勢(shì)。中國(guó)的上市公司，特別是上市公司中的 ST 公司，存在著嚴(yán)重的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題，財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)比較大，對(duì)上市公司的發(fā)展會(huì)有很大的影響。因此對(duì)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題的研究是十分重要的。通過(guò)對(duì)這一領(lǐng)域大量文獻(xiàn)的研究，從企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的成因、評(píng)價(jià)體系及控制三個(gè)角度綜述，加強(qiáng)分析，以期對(duì)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的理論和實(shí)踐研究提供借鑒和指導(dǎo)。（1）國(guó)外研究綜述西方古典經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家在十九世紀(jì)就已經(jīng)提出了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的概念，認(rèn)為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)的副產(chǎn)品，經(jīng)營(yíng)者的收入是其在經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)中承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的報(bào)酬。從狹義上看，企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是指由于利用負(fù)債給企業(yè)帶來(lái)的破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)或普通股收益發(fā)生大幅度變動(dòng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這種觀點(diǎn)立足于企業(yè)籌資時(shí)過(guò)多舉債或舉債不當(dāng)。西方國(guó)家強(qiáng)調(diào)全面風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的觀念是從資金運(yùn)動(dòng)到資本經(jīng)營(yíng)整個(gè)體系的過(guò)程，對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的控制包括風(fēng)險(xiǎn)預(yù)警、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)識(shí)別、危機(jī)處理等內(nèi)容。美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家富蘭克.H.奈特(Frank H.Knight)在 1921 年出版的(Risk， Uncertainty and Profit)一書中認(rèn)為：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是指 “可度量的不確定性” 。而“不確定性”是指不可度量的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的特征是概率估計(jì)的可靠性，概率估計(jì)的可靠性來(lái)自所遵循的理論規(guī)律或穩(wěn)定的經(jīng)驗(yàn)規(guī)律。與可計(jì)算或可預(yù)見的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不同，不確定性是指人們?nèi)狈?duì)事件的基本知識(shí)，對(duì)事件可能的結(jié)果知之甚少，因此，不能通過(guò)現(xiàn)有理論或經(jīng)驗(yàn)進(jìn)行預(yù)見和定量分析 1。1 [美] Frank H.Knight,王宇，王文玉譯.《風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、不確定性和利潤(rùn)》[M]．中國(guó)人民大學(xué)出版社．2005；2Ross, Westerfield, Jordan(1995)在《Fundamentals of Corporate Finance》提到債務(wù)籌資會(huì)增加股東的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，使用債務(wù)籌資所產(chǎn)生的這部分額外風(fēng)險(xiǎn)稱為公司股東的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。也就是說(shuō)，財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是指由于公司財(cái)務(wù)政策(如資本結(jié)構(gòu))所產(chǎn)生的權(quán)益風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。3James C. Van Horn, John M. Wachowicz Jr(2001)在《Fundamental of Financial Management》里面更寬泛地說(shuō)明了財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)包括可能喪失償債能力的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，以及由于使用財(cái)務(wù)杠桿而導(dǎo)致的每股收益變動(dòng)。美國(guó)學(xué)者小阿瑟·威廉姆斯（C.Arthur Willianms)和理查德·M. 漢斯（Richard M.Heins)在 1985 年合著的《Risk Management and Insurance》中將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)定義為：“在給定情況和特定時(shí)間內(nèi)，那些可能發(fā)生的結(jié)果間的差異。如果肯定只有一個(gè)結(jié)果發(fā)生，則差異為零，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)為零；如果有多種可能結(jié)果，則有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，且差異越大，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)越大。 ”4這種觀點(diǎn)強(qiáng)調(diào)，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是客觀存在的事物，可以從客觀角度來(lái)衡量。在財(cái)務(wù)控制方面，國(guó)外學(xué)者的研究有：美國(guó)數(shù)學(xué)家諾伯特?維納 1948 年創(chuàng)立的控制論；1932 年 FitzPatrick 開展的一元判定研究； Altman 在 1968 年首先創(chuàng)立的 zeta 模型等。總體看來(lái)，國(guó)外財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)研究起步早，理論體系完善，應(yīng)用領(lǐng)域廣，且研究成果多且系統(tǒng)。如，國(guó)外的多家風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理協(xié)會(huì)、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理學(xué)院對(duì)企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理事務(wù)、專業(yè)證書考試制度極具貢獻(xiàn)，其中，美國(guó)全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)專業(yè)人員協(xié)會(huì)每年舉辦財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理人員專業(yè)證書考試，多家協(xié)會(huì)和學(xué)會(huì)出版風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理方面的刊物雜志，還出版較多的財(cái)務(wù)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理書籍等。（2）國(guó)內(nèi)研究綜述1989 年北京商學(xué)院的劉恩祿、湯谷良發(fā)表的“論財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理” [7]，第一2 此段原文如下：“The debt finacing increases the risks borne by the stockholders. The extra risk that arises from the use of debt finacing is called the financial risk of the firm equity. In other word,financial risk is the equity risk that comes from the financial policy(i.e. capital structure) of the f1rm.”Ross,Westerfield,Jordan,Fundamentals of Corporate Finance,19953 此段原文如下：“Broadly speaking,financial risk encompasses both the risk of possible insolvency and the added variability in earnings per share that is induced byt he use of financial leverage.” James C.Van Horne,John M. Wachowicz Jr,Fundamental of Financial Management,20014小阿瑟·威廉姆斯等著，陳偉等譯． 《風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理與保險(xiǎn)》[M]．中國(guó)商業(yè)出版社．1990：4；次全面論述了財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的定義、特性及財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的步驟和方法。財(cái)政科學(xué)研究所的向德偉博士在 1994 年發(fā)表了“論財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)” [8]，全面而細(xì)致地分析了財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)生的原因，認(rèn)為“財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是一種微觀風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，是企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的集中體現(xiàn)” ， “企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，按照財(cái)務(wù)活動(dòng)的基本內(nèi)容來(lái)劃分，包括籌資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、資金回收風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和收益分配風(fēng)險(xiǎn)四項(xiàng)” ，為更深一層推進(jìn)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)理論奠定了基礎(chǔ)。唐曉云在 2000 年發(fā)表了“略論企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理” [9]，認(rèn)為企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是指在各項(xiàng)財(cái)務(wù)活動(dòng)中，由于各種難以預(yù)料或控制的因素的影響，財(cái)務(wù)狀況具有不確定性，從而使企業(yè)蒙受損失的可能性。她進(jìn)一步將財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分為籌資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、現(xiàn)金流量風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和外匯風(fēng)險(xiǎn)四種。以上觀點(diǎn)雖然對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的分類不同，但都認(rèn)為，企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是因企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)活動(dòng)中各種不確定因素的影響，使企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)收益與預(yù)期收益發(fā)生偏離，因而造成蒙受損失的機(jī)會(huì)和可能。企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)活動(dòng)的組織和管理過(guò)程中的某一方面和某個(gè)環(huán)節(jié)的問(wèn)題，都可能促使這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)閾p失，導(dǎo)致企業(yè)盈利能力和償債能力的降低。這種觀點(diǎn)是一種廣義觀。胡華在 2004 年發(fā)表了“現(xiàn)代企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的原因及防范” [10]，認(rèn)為財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的成因是由以下五點(diǎn)構(gòu)成的：1．負(fù)債經(jīng)營(yíng)是財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)生最為根本的原因。2．企業(yè)資產(chǎn)流動(dòng)性弱、現(xiàn)金流量短缺，是財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)生的最為直接的原因。3．企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)不善、投資失誤是導(dǎo)致財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)生、財(cái)務(wù)狀況惡化最為重要的催化劑。4．企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)不合理是財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)生、財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)出現(xiàn)最為綜合的因素。5．外部環(huán)境的多變性是企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)生的重要外因。2009 年，王宏發(fā)表了“淺談公司財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的成因及防范” [11]，認(rèn)為造成財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)原因的是以下四個(gè)方面：1．企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)管理的宏觀環(huán)境復(fù)雜多變,而企業(yè)管理系統(tǒng)不能適應(yīng)復(fù)雜多變的宏觀環(huán)境2．企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)管理人員對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的客觀性認(rèn)識(shí)不足3．財(cái)務(wù)決策缺乏科學(xué)性導(dǎo)致決策失誤4．企業(yè)內(nèi)部財(cái)務(wù)關(guān)系不明根據(jù)我國(guó)學(xué)者們的觀點(diǎn)不難推出，分析企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的成因離不開企業(yè)的內(nèi)外部環(huán)境因素的影響，所以本文也將從上市公司的內(nèi)外部環(huán)境來(lái)分析財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)發(fā)生的原因。易曉文（1999）發(fā)表了“上市公司財(cái)務(wù)評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)體系研究” [12]，作者在文章中對(duì)公司財(cái)務(wù)評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)體系的內(nèi)容及指標(biāo)的選取進(jìn)行了初步分析、研究。桂文林,舒曉惠,伍超標(biāo)（2005）發(fā)表了“上市公司財(cái)務(wù)評(píng)價(jià)歷史分析和展望” [13]，以上市公司財(cái)務(wù)評(píng)價(jià)現(xiàn)實(shí)意義為前提, 系統(tǒng)地分析了上市公司財(cái)務(wù)評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)體系的構(gòu)建、各種評(píng)價(jià)方法的比較以及實(shí)證研究三項(xiàng)主要內(nèi)容。并在此基礎(chǔ)上, 為進(jìn)一步發(fā)展上市公司財(cái)務(wù)評(píng)價(jià)的實(shí)證研究提供新的思路。2009 年西北大學(xué)的孫金莉發(fā)表了“基于企業(yè)現(xiàn)金流量的財(cái)務(wù)預(yù)警指標(biāo)體系研究” [14]，在認(rèn)真研究了建立企業(yè)現(xiàn)金流量財(cái)務(wù)預(yù)警系統(tǒng)的原則和程序，以及建立健全企業(yè)現(xiàn)金流量財(cái)務(wù)預(yù)警機(jī)制的基礎(chǔ)上，構(gòu)建了企業(yè)現(xiàn)金流量財(cái)務(wù)預(yù)警系統(tǒng)。李季在 2010 年發(fā)表了“上市公司財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)預(yù)警指標(biāo)研究” [15]，作者認(rèn)為目前為止國(guó)外已開發(fā)出若干財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)評(píng)價(jià)模型,有的模型在信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)價(jià)與管理企業(yè)資信評(píng)估等實(shí)務(wù)中已得到廣泛應(yīng)用。而我國(guó)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)預(yù)警指標(biāo)仍使用傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)范式,因而探索我國(guó)企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)預(yù)警指標(biāo)體系對(duì)我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革深化具有較強(qiáng)理論意義與較緊迫的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。景紅華（2010）發(fā)表了“財(cái)務(wù)困境研究應(yīng)基于現(xiàn)金流量指標(biāo)” [16]，認(rèn)為現(xiàn)金是企業(yè)賴以生存的基礎(chǔ)，現(xiàn)金流量是企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)的報(bào)警器，企業(yè)的生存和發(fā)展在很大程度上取決于現(xiàn)金，因此，財(cái)務(wù)困境研究應(yīng)基于現(xiàn)金流量指標(biāo)。通過(guò)閱讀大量關(guān)于企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)價(jià)體系的相關(guān)資料的，了解到，要知道企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況如何，必須從償債能力指標(biāo)、營(yíng)運(yùn)能力指標(biāo)、盈利能力指標(biāo)及現(xiàn)金流量風(fēng)險(xiǎn)指標(biāo)方面來(lái)研究。童宏賓在 2004 年發(fā)表了“企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成因及控制” [17]，簡(jiǎn)單地從規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、轉(zhuǎn)移風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和提高企業(yè)的盈利能力三個(gè)方面來(lái)對(duì)上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)作出控制。王海翔（2005）發(fā)表了“論企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及其控制” [18]，較全面地從 MM理論和期權(quán)理論來(lái)研究企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的控制。吳景杰、施紹梅（2005）發(fā)表了“財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的控制” [19]，認(rèn)為在運(yùn)用理論方法進(jìn)行財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析時(shí),需要管理人員對(duì)具體環(huán)境、方法的切合性及某些條件進(jìn)行合理假設(shè)和估計(jì)。另外，在采取防范和規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的對(duì)策時(shí)，也必須以規(guī)范、科學(xué)的管理為基礎(chǔ)，否則因使用對(duì)策不當(dāng)反而有可能招致更大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。2009 年盛九春和葉波二人發(fā)表了“現(xiàn)代企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的防范和控制” [20]，總結(jié)了三點(diǎn)防范與控制的措施：1．完善財(cái)務(wù)管理系統(tǒng)，提高財(cái)務(wù)決策的科學(xué)化水平2．強(qiáng)化財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范意識(shí)，樹立正確的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)觀念3．建立健全企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)識(shí)別與預(yù)警系統(tǒng)孔遠(yuǎn)英（2010）發(fā)表了“關(guān)于企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制的幾點(diǎn)建議” [21]，認(rèn)為企業(yè)發(fā)生財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)是一個(gè)逐步顯現(xiàn)、緩慢惡化的過(guò)程，它的發(fā)生具有一定的先兆，因此具有可預(yù)測(cè)性。為了規(guī)避和防范財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，企業(yè)有必要對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)進(jìn)行充分的認(rèn)識(shí)和分析，及時(shí)糾正、改進(jìn)、并制定相應(yīng)的對(duì)策，有效地完善財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)預(yù)警機(jī)制。我國(guó)學(xué)者對(duì)于財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制問(wèn)題的解決幾乎都離不開規(guī)避和防范，觀點(diǎn)不一，本本文會(huì)在此基礎(chǔ)上提出中國(guó)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制存在的問(wèn)題及提出對(duì)研究有價(jià)值的策略。3、評(píng)述與啟示東南亞金融危機(jī)以來(lái)，國(guó)家安全己成為各國(guó)關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)之一。國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)安全必須從防范金融危機(jī)、財(cái)政危機(jī)著手，這已為人們所重視，但人們常忽略金融危機(jī)與財(cái)政危機(jī)的基礎(chǔ)是財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)。財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)主要表現(xiàn)為公司資本循環(huán)周轉(zhuǎn)被打亂而導(dǎo)致的支付危機(jī)，它常常潛伏于財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之中 [12]。資本市場(chǎng)的繁榮為企業(yè)實(shí)現(xiàn)跨越式發(fā)展提供了無(wú)限可能。大型上市公司舞弊的丑聞尚未消散，次貸危機(jī)引發(fā)的金融海嘯又席卷了全球。而此前的短短幾年間，我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)迎來(lái)了空前繁榮，眾多上市公司增發(fā)新股，許多尚不具備上市條件的公司也在積極整改包裝上市。盡管股市是否出現(xiàn)明顯泡沫尚存在爭(zhēng)議，但是沒(méi)有健康的盈利增長(zhǎng)，這種繁榮是難以維系的。謀求資本市場(chǎng)的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展必須從上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)著手。有效的控制財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可以均衡各方利益，規(guī)范上市公司行為，使其健康有序的運(yùn)行。學(xué)者們的研究提高了我們對(duì)企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的重視，并且更有助于我們開拓企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制的新思路、新方法，使其在我國(guó)企業(yè)中得以更好地運(yùn)用。因狹義的觀點(diǎn)明顯片面地理解力財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，所以，本文將采用廣義的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)觀點(diǎn)，它符合人們對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)概念的理解，便于從更寬廣的角度來(lái)研究財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。希望借鑒國(guó)內(nèi)外先進(jìn)理論，通過(guò)對(duì)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的基本分析, 采用一定的方法, 對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)加以控制,以達(dá)到企業(yè)利益最優(yōu)的目的。參考文獻(xiàn)：[1]Shyam,Sunder.Theory Accounting and Control[J].An Innternational Theory on PublishingComPany.1997;[2]Ogryezak,W,Ruszeznski,A. 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Credit Rating:Methodologies,Rationale and Default Risk[M]．Risk Books,London. 2002;[7] 劉恩祿，湯谷良．論財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理[N]．北京商學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào)．1989(01)；[8] 向德偉．論財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)[J]．會(huì)計(jì)研究． 1994(4)；[9] 唐曉云．略論企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理[J] .上海會(huì)計(jì)．2000(2))；[10] 胡華．現(xiàn)代企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的原因及防范[J] ．會(huì)計(jì)之友． 2004(1)﹕52-53；[11] 王宏．淺談公司財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的成因及防范[J] ．內(nèi)蒙古科技與經(jīng)濟(jì)． 2009(4)﹕33-34；[12] 易曉文．上市公司財(cái)務(wù)評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)體系研究[N]．溫州大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)．1999(3)；[13] 桂文林，舒曉惠，伍超標(biāo)．上市公司財(cái)務(wù)評(píng)價(jià)歷史分析和展望[J] ．工業(yè)技術(shù)濟(jì)．2005(02)；[14] 孫金莉．基于企業(yè)現(xiàn)金流量的財(cái)務(wù)預(yù)警指標(biāo)體系研究[D]．西北大學(xué)．2009；[15] 李季．上市公司財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)預(yù)警指標(biāo)研究[J] ．企業(yè)家天地 (理論版)．2010(09)；[16] 景紅華．財(cái)務(wù)困境研究應(yīng)基于現(xiàn)金流量指標(biāo)[J] ．新財(cái)經(jīng) (理論版)．2010(10)；[17] 童宏兵．企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成因及控制[J] ．財(cái)務(wù)與審計(jì)． 2004(7)﹕61；[18] 王海翔．論企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及其控制[D]．首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)．2005﹕13-24；[19] 吳景杰，施紹梅．財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的控制[J] ．理財(cái)雜志．2005(06)﹕32-33；[20] 盛九春，葉波．現(xiàn)代企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的防范和控制[J] ．財(cái)經(jīng)管理． 2009(4)﹕203；[21] 孔遠(yuǎn)英．關(guān)于企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制的幾點(diǎn)建議[J] ．海峽科學(xué) ．2010(03)；外文資料Financial ?rm bankruptcy and systemic riskIn Fall 2008 when the Federal Reserve and the Treasury injected $85 billion into the insurance behemoth American International Group (AIG), themoney lent to AIGwent straight to counterparties, and very few funds remained with the insurer. Among the largest recipients was Goldman Sachs, to whomabout $12 billionwas paid to undoAIG’s credit default swaps (CDSs). The bailout plan focused on repaying the debt by slowly selling off AIG’s assets, with no intention of maintaining jobs or allowing the CDSmarket to continue to function as before. Thus, the government’s effort to avoid systemic risk with AIG was mainly about ensuring that ?rms with which AIG had done business did not fail as a result. The concerns are obviously greatest vis-a-vis CDSs, ofwhich AIG had over $400 billion contracts outstanding in June 2008.In contrast, the government was much less enthusiastic about aiding General Motors, presumably because they believed its failure would not cause major macroeconomic repercussions by imposing losses on related ?rms. This decision is consistent with the view in macroeconomic research that financial?rmbankruptcies pose a greater amount of systemic risk than nonfinancial firmbankruptcies. For example, Bordo and Haubrich (2009) conclude that “.more severe ?nancial events are associated withmore severe recessions.” Likewise, Bernanke (1983) argues the Great Depressionwas so severe because ofweakness in the banking systemthat affected the amount of credit available for investment. Bernanke et al. (1999) hypothesize a financial accelerator mechanism, whereby distress in one sector of the economy leads to more precarious balance sheets and tighter credit conditions. This in turn leads to a drop in investment, which is followed by less lending and a widespread downturn. Were shocks to the economy always to come in the form of distress at non?nancial ?rms, these authors argue that the business downturns would not be so severe.We argue instead that the contagious impact of a nonfinancial firm’s bankruptcy is expected to be far larger than that of a financial ?rm like AIG, although neither would be catastrophic to the U.S. economy through counterparty risk channels. This is not to say that an episode ofwidespread financial distress among our largest banks would not be followed by an especially severe recession, only that such failures would not cause a recession or affect the depth of a recession. Rather such bankruptcies are symptomatic of common factors in portfolios that lead to wealth losses regardless of whether any firm ?les for bankruptcy.Pervasive ?nancial fragility may occur because the failure of one ?rm leads to the failure of other ?rms which cascades through the system (e.g., Davis and Lo, 1999; Jarrow and Yu, 2001). Or systemic risk may wreak havoc when a number of ?nancial ?rms fail simultaneously, as in the Great Depression when more than 9000 banks failed (Benston, 1986). In the former case, the failure of one ?rm, such as AIG, Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns, could lead to widespread failure through ?nancial contracts such as CDSs. In the latter case, the fact that so many ?nancial institutions have failed means that both the money supply and the amount of credit in the economy could fall so far as to cause a large drop in economic activity (Friedman and Schwartz, 1971).While a weak ?nancial systemcould cause a recession, the recession would not arise because one ?rm was allowed to ?le bankruptcy. Further, should one or the other ?rmgo bankrupt, the non?nancial ?rmwould have the greater impact on the economy.Such extreme real effects that appear to be the result of ?nancial ?rm fragility have led to a large emphasis on the prevention of systemic risk problems by regulators. Foremost among these policies is “too big to fail” (TBTF), the logic of which is that the failure of a large ?nancial institution will have ramifications for other ?nancial institutions and therefore the risk to the economywould be enormous. TBTF was behind the Fed’s decisions to orchestrate the merger of Bear Stearns and J.P. Morgan Chase in 2008, its leadership in the restructuring of bank loans owed by Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), and its decision to prop up AIG. TBTF may be justi?ed if the outcome is prevention of a major downswing in the economy. However, if the systemic risks in these episodes have been exaggerated or the salutary effects of these actions overestimated, then the cost to the ef?ciency of the capital allocation system may far outweigh any potential bene?ts from attempting to avoid another Great Depression.No doubt, no regulator wants to take the chance of standing down while watching over another systemic risk crisis, sowe do not have the ability to examine empiricallywhat happens to the economy when regulators back off. There are very fewinstances in themodern history of the U.S.where regulators allowed the bankruptcy of amajor ?nancial ?rm.Most recently,we can point to the bankruptcy of Lehman,which the Fed pointedly allowed to fail.However,with only one obvious casewhere TBTFwas abandoned, we have only an inkling of how TBTF policy affects systemic risk. Moreover, at the same time that Lehman failed, the Fed was intervening in the commercial paper market and aiding money marketmutual fundswhile AIGwas downgraded and subsequently bailed out. In addition, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury were scaremongering about the prospects of a second Great Depression to make the passage of TARPmore likely. Thuswewill never knowif themarket downturn that followed the Lehman bankruptcy re?ected fear of contagion from Lehman to the real economy or fear of the depths of existing problems in the real economy that were highlighted so dramatically by regulators.In this paper we analyze the mechanisms by which such risk could cause an economy-wide col-lapse.We focus on two types of contagion that might lead to systemic risk problems: (1) information contagion,where the information that one ?nancial ?rmis troubled is associatedwith negative shocksat other ?nancial institutions largely because the ?rms share common risk factors; or (2) counterparty contagion,where one important ?nancial institution’s collapse leads directly to troubles at other cred-itor ?rms whose troubles snowball and drive other ?rms into distress. The ef?cacy of TBTF policies depends crucially on which of these two types of systemic riskmechanisms dominates.Counterparty contagion may warrant intervention in individual bank failureswhile information contagion does not.If regulators do not step in to bail out an individual ?rm, the alternative is to let it fail. In the case of a bank, the process involves the FDIC as receiver and the insured liabilities of the ?rmare very quickly repaid. In contrast, the failure of an investment bank or hedge fund does not involve the FDIC andmay closely resemble a Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 ?ling of a non?nancial ?rm. However, if the nonbank ?nancial ?rm in question has liabilities that are covered by the Securities Industry Protection Corporation (SIPC), the ?rmis required by lawunder the Securities Industry Protection Act (SIPA) to liquidate under Chapter 7 (Don and Wang, 1990). This explains in large partwhy only the holding company of Lehman ?led for bankruptcy in 2008 and its broker–dealer subsidiaries were not part of the Chapter 11 ?ling.A major fear of a ?nancial ?rm liquidation, whether done through the FDIC or as required by SIPA, is that ?re sales will depress recoveries for the creditors of the failed ?nancial ?rm and that these ?re saleswill have rami?cations for other ?rms in related businesses, even if these businesses do not have direct ties to the failed ?rm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). This fear was behind the Fed’s decision to extend liquidity to primary dealers inMarch 2008 – Fed Chairman Bernanke explained in a speech on ?nancial system stability that“the risk developed that liquidity pressuresmight force dealers to sell assets into already illiquid markets. Thismight have resulted in.[a] ?re sale scenario., inwhich a cascade of failures andliquidations sharply depresses asset prices, with adverse ?nancial and economic implications.”(May 13, 2008 speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta conference at Sea Island, Georgia)The fear of potential ?re sales is expressed in further detail in the same speech as a reason for the merger of Bear Stearns and JP Morgan:“Bear.would be forced to ?le for bankruptcy.[which] would have forced Bear’s secured creditors and counterparties to liquidate the underlying collateral and, given the illiquidity of markets, those creditors and counter parties might well have sustained losses. If they responded to losses or the unexpected illiquidity of their holdings by pulling back from providing secured ?nancing to other ?rms, a much broader liquidity crisis would have ensued.”The idea that creditors of a failed ?rm are forced to liquidate assets, and to do so with haste, is counter to the basic tenets of U.S. bankruptcy laws, which are set up to allow creditors the ability to maximize the value of the assets now under their control. If that value is greatest when continuing to operate, the laws allow such a reorganization of the ?rm. If the value in liquidation is higher, the laws are in no way prejudiced against selling assets in an orderly procedure. Bankruptcy actually reduces the likelihood of ?re sales because assets are not sold quickly once a bankruptcy ?ling occurs. Cash does not leave the bankrupt firm without the approval of a judge.Without pressure to pay debts, the ?rm can remain in bankruptcy for months as it tries to decide on the best course of action. Indeed, a major complaint about the U.S. code is that debtors can easily delay reorganizing and slow down the process.If, however, creditors and management believe that speedy assets sales are in their best interest, then they can press the bankruptcy judge to approve quick action. This occurred in the case of Lehman’s asset sale to Barclays, which involved hiring workers whomight have split up were their divisions not sold quickly.金融公司破產(chǎn)及系統(tǒng)性的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)2008 年秋，當(dāng)美聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)和財(cái)政部拒絕 85 億美金巨資保險(xiǎn)投入到美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)時(shí)，這邊借給美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的貨款就直接落到了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手手里，而投保人只得到極少的一部分資金。在那些大的受益人當(dāng)中，高盛用 12 億美金來(lái)撤銷美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的信用違約互換。這一應(yīng)急方案通過(guò)逐步售出美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的資產(chǎn)來(lái)償還貸款，而不是保住崗位或者是確保短期貸款市場(chǎng)像之前那樣持續(xù)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)揮市場(chǎng)效能。因此，政府避免美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的目的，是為了確保美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)的商業(yè)伙伴不至于破產(chǎn)。從這一出發(fā)點(diǎn)，很明顯是信用違約互換當(dāng)中最好的一個(gè)。也是因?yàn)檫@一點(diǎn)，相比 2008 年美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)多贏得4000 億的合同。 在條款當(dāng)中，美國(guó)政府在援助通用汽車時(shí)表現(xiàn)的并沒(méi)那么積極，可能是因?yàn)檎_信，通用的破產(chǎn)把損失強(qiáng)加到相關(guān)的合作企業(yè)，這樣不會(huì)對(duì)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生太大的壞影響。這一決定和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)調(diào)查的結(jié)果是一致的，即金融公司的破產(chǎn)比非金融公司的破產(chǎn)產(chǎn)生的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)大很多。例如 Bordo和 Haubrich 提到“越是嚴(yán)重的金融事件越是和嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退聯(lián)系在一起。 ”同樣的，Bernanke 反駁道，大蕭條如此的讓經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退是因?yàn)殂y行業(yè)的缺陷影響到投資的信用度。Bernanke 假設(shè)一種金融加速器機(jī)制，在這樣的機(jī)制中，經(jīng)濟(jì)的一個(gè)領(lǐng)域破產(chǎn)導(dǎo)致更多的不穩(wěn)固的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表和緊張的信貸狀況。這反過(guò)來(lái)就導(dǎo)致投資的減少，隨之而來(lái)的是變少的貸款和普遍的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。如果對(duì)非金融企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊都是以破產(chǎn)的形式呈現(xiàn)，這些作者們?cè)谵q論經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷好似不會(huì)很嚴(yán)重的。我們反而認(rèn)為非金融企業(yè)破產(chǎn)的連鎖影響遠(yuǎn)比金融企業(yè)的大，就像美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)。雖然通過(guò)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手風(fēng)險(xiǎn)渠道，不會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生毀滅性的打擊。但并不是說(shuō)一段時(shí)期在大銀行間的經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷不會(huì)伴隨沖擊很大的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。只是因?yàn)檫@樣是經(jīng)濟(jì)失利不會(huì)引起經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，也不會(huì)影響經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的深度。不管是哪一種類型的企業(yè)破產(chǎn)，這樣的破產(chǎn)在企業(yè)股份中不是常見的導(dǎo)致經(jīng)濟(jì)損失的癥狀。因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)公司的倒閉導(dǎo)致其他公司的倒閉形成系統(tǒng)內(nèi)的一種聯(lián)級(jí)，這樣就會(huì)產(chǎn)生普遍的經(jīng)濟(jì)脆弱的現(xiàn)象。當(dāng)許多金融公司同時(shí)倒閉，系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)減弱經(jīng)濟(jì)的破壞力度，就像在大蕭條時(shí)期，9000 多家銀行倒閉。在前一種案例中，一家公司的倒閉，譬如像美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)，雷曼兄弟，或者貝爾斯登這樣的公司倒閉，會(huì)導(dǎo)致倒閉現(xiàn)象在金融界蔓延，例如信用違約互換。在后一種案例中，事實(shí)是許多金融機(jī)構(gòu)的倒閉意味著不僅僅是貨幣的供應(yīng)，而且只要經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)中的破敗，就會(huì)降低信用額度。當(dāng)脆弱的金融系統(tǒng)引起經(jīng)濟(jì)的蕭條時(shí)，經(jīng)濟(jì)蕭條就不會(huì)產(chǎn)生，因?yàn)楣究梢陨暾?qǐng)破產(chǎn)。而且如果只是一兩個(gè)公司的破產(chǎn)，非金融企業(yè)會(huì)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生更大的影響。這樣極端且真實(shí)的影響是金融企業(yè)的脆弱性導(dǎo)致調(diào)控者特別強(qiáng)調(diào)對(duì)系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的預(yù)防。這些政策當(dāng)中，最突出的是“太大以至于破產(chǎn)”(TBTF 的邏輯)，這一觀點(diǎn)的思維方式是，一個(gè)大型的金融機(jī)構(gòu)的倒閉將會(huì)影響到其分支的金融機(jī)構(gòu)，因此，對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是很大的。太大而倒閉是 2008 年隨著美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)決定合并貝爾斯登公司和摩根大通銀行之后產(chǎn)生的，在重建銀行貨代時(shí)期的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)是長(zhǎng)期資金管理，這一政策的決定是支援美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)。如果結(jié)果是阻止了經(jīng)濟(jì)的衰退，太大而倒閉的政策將會(huì)被證實(shí)。然而，如果在這一段時(shí)期系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)被夸大，或者所采取的措施的益處被高估，資金分配以避免另外一場(chǎng)大蕭條的效率代價(jià)體系將遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出任何潛在的利益。毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，在觀察另外一個(gè)系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的時(shí)候，沒(méi)有管理者想乘機(jī)撤退。因此當(dāng)管理者推到一邊的時(shí)候，我們不能憑經(jīng)驗(yàn)來(lái)考核決定經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況。當(dāng)今的美國(guó)，很少有管理者同意一家大的金融公司破產(chǎn)的。最近，我們可以看到雷曼兄弟的破產(chǎn)，這是美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)，逼不得已同意破產(chǎn)的企業(yè)。然而，雷曼兄弟的破產(chǎn)是唯一一個(gè)顯而易見的例子表明太大而倒閉的政策是名不副實(shí)的，我們只看到中意政策對(duì)系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的微不足道的影響。此外，與此同時(shí)因雷曼兄弟的倒閉，此外,與此同時(shí),雷曼兄弟的失敗的情況下,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)正在干預(yù)商業(yè)市場(chǎng)、促進(jìn)貨幣資金,而美國(guó)國(guó)際集團(tuán)是跳傘了。而且，美聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備局和財(cái)政局即將散布第二次大蕭條的謠言，以彰顯其采取的措施的有效性。因此，我們將永遠(yuǎn)不知道雷曼兄弟的破產(chǎn)是否會(huì)導(dǎo)致市場(chǎng)低迷，以及從雷曼兄弟破產(chǎn)致使人們對(duì)破產(chǎn)的恐懼反映到現(xiàn)實(shí)的經(jīng)濟(jì)上來(lái)或者管理者對(duì)人們的現(xiàn)實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)體中存在的問(wèn)題的恐懼進(jìn)行無(wú)限的夸大。在本論文中，我們分析會(huì)引起經(jīng)濟(jì)崩潰風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體制。我們關(guān)注兩種可能引起系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題的蔓延：（1）信息蔓延，一個(gè)金融機(jī)構(gòu)的困境會(huì)對(duì)其他金融企業(yè)產(chǎn)生一系列的消極影響，主要是因?yàn)檫@些企業(yè)有許多共同的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素。（2）對(duì)手蔓延，一個(gè)重要的金融機(jī)構(gòu)倒閉直接導(dǎo)致其他信貸機(jī)構(gòu)的危機(jī)，這些危機(jī)會(huì)產(chǎn)生滾雪球效應(yīng)，引起其他金融企業(yè)倒閉。太大而倒閉主義政策的有效性主要依據(jù)于這兩種系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的控制。對(duì)手蔓延會(huì)授權(quán)干預(yù)每一個(gè)倒閉的銀行，不過(guò)信息蔓延就不會(huì)。如果管理者不介入救助某一企業(yè)，要不就是任其倒閉。例如一家銀行，處理的過(guò)程包括以美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄保險(xiǎn)公司作為其產(chǎn)業(yè)管理人，使其擔(dān)保的債務(wù)在很短的時(shí)間里還清。相反，如果破產(chǎn)的是一個(gè)投資銀行或者是對(duì)沖基金沒(méi)有參與美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄保險(xiǎn)公司，這可能是很像第 11 章和第 7 章那樣的非金融企業(yè)。然而，我們所說(shuō)的非金融企業(yè)的債務(wù)是由證券行業(yè)保護(hù)公司承擔(dān)的，這樣的企業(yè)是要遵守證券行業(yè)保護(hù)法令的條例的第 7 章來(lái)停止經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)。這在很大程度上解釋了 2008 年為什么雷曼兄弟的持股公司申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)其證券交易子公司不在第11 章的備案里面。對(duì)金融企業(yè)破產(chǎn)停止運(yùn)行最大的憂慮在于，減價(jià)出售致使倒閉和企業(yè)債權(quán)人對(duì)企業(yè)復(fù)蘇的絕望，這樣的減價(jià)出售還會(huì)使相關(guān)聯(lián)的企業(yè)具有負(fù)面影響，即便這些企業(yè)和倒閉的企業(yè)沒(méi)有直接的關(guān)系，不論是否經(jīng)過(guò)美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄保險(xiǎn)公司還是被證券行業(yè)保護(hù)法令所規(guī)定的。這些擔(dān)憂都是由于在 2008 年 3 月聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)決定擴(kuò)大停產(chǎn)決定到初級(jí)證券交易人。聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)的主席在一次關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)系統(tǒng)穩(wěn)定性的演講中說(shuō)：“形成的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就是停產(chǎn)的壓力可能迫使交易者們變賣財(cái)產(chǎn)到不動(dòng)產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)。這就將導(dǎo)致低價(jià)出售的情形。并且金融市場(chǎng)的普遍低迷和運(yùn)用的停止將會(huì)對(duì)資產(chǎn)的價(jià)格產(chǎn)生很到的影響，對(duì)金融和經(jīng)濟(jì)都會(huì)產(chǎn)生不良影響。 ”（2008 年 5 月 13 日在喬治亞州，聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄銀行亞特南大海島會(huì)議上的演講。 ）對(duì)低價(jià)銷售的恐懼也反映在后來(lái)同樣的對(duì)于貝爾斯登和摩根大通現(xiàn)象出現(xiàn)的原因的演講里面：“熊市…迫使申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)…這樣的狀況會(huì)迫使熊市的穩(wěn)固的債權(quán)人和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手來(lái)制止?jié)撛诘牡归]的可能性，如果市場(chǎng)的流通性不足，這些債權(quán)人和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手將要承擔(dān)損失。如果他們對(duì)于其資產(chǎn)的損失和突如其來(lái)的流動(dòng)性不足，是通過(guò)撤資投資到其他有保障的金融業(yè)里面，這樣一來(lái)，更大的資金流動(dòng)危機(jī)將接踵而來(lái)。 ”一個(gè)倒閉企業(yè)的債權(quán)人被迫匆匆凍結(jié)資產(chǎn)，這是有悖于美國(guó)破產(chǎn)法的基本信條的。美國(guó)破產(chǎn)法是讓債權(quán)人能夠使其名下的財(cái)產(chǎn)達(dá)到最大價(jià)值。如果在操作過(guò)程中達(dá)到最大值，法律就會(huì)允許該企業(yè)重組。如果在價(jià)值在停產(chǎn)之后變更高，破產(chǎn)法是絕不會(huì)干擾資產(chǎn)的有序變賣。破產(chǎn)其實(shí)是減少低價(jià)甩賣的可能性，因?yàn)橘Y產(chǎn)不是在申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)批下來(lái)之后立即可以變賣的。倒閉公司的資產(chǎn)只有在得到法官的判決才可以兌現(xiàn)。沒(méi)有償還債務(wù)的壓力，企業(yè)可以保持在破產(chǎn)狀態(tài)幾個(gè)月，這段時(shí)間可以理智地作出采取最好措施的決定。實(shí)際上，對(duì)美國(guó)法律的主要投訴時(shí)債務(wù)人可以趁機(jī)對(duì)重組進(jìn)行無(wú)期限拖延并且放慢這一過(guò)程。然而，如果債權(quán)人和管理層認(rèn)為迅速的財(cái)產(chǎn)變賣是對(duì)他們最有益的，那么他們可以給破產(chǎn)鑒定的法官施壓來(lái)達(dá)到判決的火速進(jìn)行。這樣的情形發(fā)生在巴克萊銀行收購(gòu)雷曼兄弟的案例上，這一過(guò)涉及雇傭可能導(dǎo)致分裂的子公司的個(gè)人，只是資產(chǎn)不能盡快售出。